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Attorneys for Defendant James Taylor, 0.0.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
CAROL ENGLISH and ERIC ENGLISH,
wife and husband,
Plaintiffs,

)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2013-0004868-0C

DEFENDANT JAMES TAYLOR, D.0.'S
) REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
COOK IN CORPORA TED, an Indiana
)
OF FIRST MOTION FOR
corporation; COOK MEDICAL
)
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
IN CORPORATED, an Indiana Corporation; )
COOK MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES, LCC,)
an Indiana LLC; JAMES TAYLOR, D.O.; )
EASTERN IDAHO HEALTH SERVICES, )
INC. dba EASTERN IDAHO REGIONAL )
MEDICAL CENTER, an Idaho Corporation;)
and DOES 1-20;
)
)
Defendants.
)
V.

)

COMES NOW Defendant James Taylor, 0.0., by and through counsel ofrecord,and submits
the following Reply Memorandum in Support of his First Motion For Summary Judgment.

DEFENDANT JAMES TAYLOR, D.O.'S REPLY MEMORAl'luUM n~ SUPPORT OF FIRST
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

2

ARGUMENT
Decision.

Plaintiffs contend that the Idaho Supreme Court's decision

Terra-West,

v. Idaho i\lfut.

Trust, LLC, 150 Idaho 393,247 P.3d 620 (2010), is dispositive in their favor of the issues raised by
the health care defendants. Their arguments are incorrect for two reasons: (A) Terra-West did not
clarify or overturn the Griggs decision which is the controlling law of this case and (B) the Plaintiffs'
failed to provide notice as outlined in Terra-West.
A.

Terra-West did not Clarify or Reverse the Griggs Decision.

The dispute in Terra-West did not involve the addition of new parties. Rather, the plaintiff:
Terra-West, filed a motion to amend the complaint to foreclose on a second mechanic's lien. Id. at
395. Idaho Mutual was already a party to the action by way of the original complaint filed by TerraWest Id. at 394. Thus, the dispute centered around plaintiff's ability to add a new claim against
an already named defendant. That is not this case.

There is no dispute that Plaintiffs in the present action did not name Dr. Taylor or EIRMC
in the original complaint or even in the first amended complaint. No claims for medical negligence
were commenced with Plaintiffs' filing of the original or first amended complaint.
This factual scenario was a significant distinction to the Idaho Supreme Court. With the
distinct facts of Terra-West in mind, the Idaho Supreme Court analyzed its decision in Griggs v.
Nash, 116 Idaho 228, 775 P.2d 120 (1989).

That analysis is extremely important to the

determination of the issues involved in this case. First, the court stated, " ... our decision in Griggs
is distinguishable from the case at bar because it concerned the timeliness of a third-party complaint,
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is categorically different than a motion to amend to add a new claim against a party who

at

lS

to this

decision in the case at hand.
In our case, Plaintiffs are not in the same position as the plaintiff in Terra-West. In fact, the
motion to file a second amended complaint filed by these Plaintiffs is, as the Terra-West Court
stated, categorically different than a motion to amend to add a new claim against a party who is
already part of the action. Rather, these Plaintiffs by their motion to amend fully intended to add
new claims for medical negligence against a doctor and a hospital who were not parties to the
original or first amended complaints. The Idaho Supreme Court was very specific that the factual
situation of this case should be treated differently than the factual situation in Terra-West when it
stated:
In the context of a third-party complaint, there may be a good reason to prefer the
more cumbersome method ofrequiringthe filing ofan independent action against the
third party to commence the proceedings. Under IRCP 14(a), a motion for leave to
file a third-party complaint, even if the proposed complaint is attached to the motion,
does not give any notice to the third party that it may be subject to an impending
action. Because the third partv would not be served with the motion for leave to file
the third-party complaint, the third party may discover, after the expiration of the
applicable statute of limitations, that a previously filed motion to which the
third party had no notice, commenced the proceedings. Such a rule is contrary
to the purposes of any statute of limitations ....
Id. at 399-400 (emphasis added).

In the context of this case, there is no distinction between filing a motion for leave to file a
third-party complaint and a motion for leave to file an amended complaint designed only to add new
claims against new parties. There is no dispute that Plaintiffs in this case filed the second motion
to amend their complaint for the sole purpose of adding two new parties and claims of medical

3
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not

to

new

the

or
to

Idaho Supreme

in Terra-West and prompted a statement that a more cumbersome

process was justified in those circumstances is exactly what happened in the case at hand. Dr. Taylor
was not served with the motion to amend the complaint or the proposed second amended complaint.
Plaintiffs do not dispute this fact. Dr. Taylor only discovered, after the expiration of the applicable
statute oflimitations, that a previously filed motion (of which he had no notice) commenced medical
malpractice proceedings against him. As noted by the Court in Terra-West, allowing that to occur,
as requested by these Plaintiffs, is contrary to the very purposes of the statute of limitations.

It is not Dr. Taylor who is ignoring or misapplying Idaho law. With regard to the issue of
timely commencing an action, this case is nearly identical to the facts in Griggs. Based on the facts
of this case, as clearly indicated by Terra-West, the Idaho Supreme Court would not distinguish this
case from Griggs. Rather, there is no doubt that the Idaho Supreme Court would apply the holding
in Griggs to the facts of this case. For those reasons, the Griggs decision is the binding precedent
which mandates the dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims against Dr. Taylor and EIRMC and no further
analysis is necessary.
B.

Proper Notice Was Not Given.

Plaintiffs assert that under the Terra-West decision, all that is required to add a new party to
a lawsuit is (1) to file a motion to amend the complaint naming the new party prior to the expiration
of the statute of limitations and (2) provide the new party with notice of the substance of the claim
against the new party. Even if Plaintiffs' interpretation of Terra-West were correct (and it is not as

4
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above),

to

Taylor or

An important part of the analysis in many of the cases discussed above involves
whether the defendant had notice of the substance of the proposed amendment
prior to expiration of the statutory time period either because the plaintiff had
attached the amended complaint to the motion for leave to amend, or because the text
of the motion itself detailed the substance of the proposed amendment.
Id. at 399 (emphasis added). A plain reading of this language requires more than a mere letter or a
telephone call to provide proper notice. As noted by the Idaho Supreme Court, in each case, the
party received actual notice of the change in the pleading by either ( 1) receiving a copy of the
proposed amended complaint or (2) receiving a copy of the motion to amend which itself contained
a detailed explanation of the substance of the proposed amendment.
By way of example, Justice Jones, writing for the majority, noted that central to the
Rademaker Court's decision was the fact that the defendant had been served with a motion that
"fully and comprehensively" laid out the substance of the proposed amendment prior to the

expiration of the statute of limitations. Id. at 399.
Our Supreme Court then stated:
In this case, because Idaho Mutual was not dismissed from the case following the
invalidation of the first lien, the motion for leave to file the amended complaint gave
notice to Idaho Mutual within the six-month jurisdictional time limit that Terra-West
was seeking to foreclose the second lien .... Furthermore, the proposed amended
complaint was attached to the motion for leave to amend, which further demonstrates
that Idaho Mutual had notice of the commencement of the foreclosure action
within the six-month time limitation. 1

In fact, because of the notice, Idaho Mutual was provided with an opportunity to
oppose Terra-West's motion to amend the complaint to foreclose on the second mechanic's lien
before the motion was granted. Id. at 395. No such opportunity has ever been provided to Dr.
Taylor or E1Rl'v1C.
5
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· added).
case, it is
on or about December 10, 20 l

was

to
Plaintiffs never served Dr. Taylor with a copy of the

motion or the proposed second amended complaint until he was actually served with the Second
Amended Complaint on March 21, 2014. See Affidavit of.James Taylor, D.O., page 2, para. 2-3.
Plaintiffs do not dispute the fact that they did not even attempt to serve Dr. Taylor until after
December 19, 2013-the date the statute of limitations expired. As such, unlike the defendant in

Terra-West and the cases cited therein, Dr. Taylor never received notice of the commencement of
the action against him within the appropriate statute of limitations. In light of the Terra-West
decision, this fact alone should be sufficient grounds for the Court to grant Dr. Taylor's motion for
summary judgment.
Without citing applicable Idaho authority2, Plaintiffs contend that they gave sufficient notice
to the health care defendants by way of letters, telephone calls,3 and the Prelitigation Screening
procedure. Citing Longo v. Pennsylvania Electric Co., 618 F. Supp. 87 (W.D. Pa. 1985)4, Plaintiffs

2

Other than blithely stating that Terra-West cited favorably other cases which allegedly
allowed letters or phone calls as sufficient notice, Plaintiffs provided no additional analysis.
3

As referenced in the prior filings, Dr. Taylor received only one letter prior to the
expiration of the statute oflimitations. That letter was vague at best with regard to a potential claim
against Dr. Taylor especially in light of the unrefuted statements made by Plaintiffs to Dr. Taylor that
they did not want nor intend to sue him.
4

Longo was a FRCP 15(c) case in which the newly added defendant argued that there
was a mistaken identity because plaintiff had named M. Caupellotte instead of Frank J. Carpellotti
d/b/a Carp Transit. M. Carpellotti Trucking was owned by the defendant's mother. The federal
district court held that because the two entities shared the same address and the defendant spoke with
plaintiff shortly after the accident, there was no prejudice to the defendant by the amended complaint
because he had received notice of the institution of the action and knew that but for a mistake
6
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that as

as a

notice. Plaintiffs'

at

5.

If a simple phone call or letter were sufficient to provide the notice required by the statute
of limitations, why would the Idaho Supreme Court have stated, "In the context of a third-party
complaint, there may be good reason to prefer the more cumbersome method ofrequiring the filing
of an independent action against the third party to commence the proceedings"? Terra-West at 3 99.
Clearly in the context ofan amendment adding new parties, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded that
more was required than simply filing a motion to amend with a copy of the complaint attached such
as actually filing an independent action before the statute of limitations expired.
The Court in Terra-West also specifically referred to the newly named defendant receiving
notice of the commencement of proceedings against him. Id. at 400 (" ... the third-party may discover,
after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, that a previously filed motion to which
the third-party had no notice, commenced the proceedings.") Allowing a party to provide notice to
a non-party by simply sending a letter or making a telephone call would open a Pandora's Box for
Idaho judges attempting to determine whether or not actual notice was received by the new party.
On the other hand, as stated by the Idaho Supreme Court, when adding a party to ongoing
litigation, the better rule is to file an independent action before the statute of limitations expires.
Then, there is no question that the action is timely and no need to argue about whether a party did
or did not receive adequate notice. That rationale is consistent with the Court's decision in Terra-

concerning identity, the action would have been brought against him. Id. at 90. There was no
specific reference as to how the defendant had notice of the institution of the action.
7
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that a
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to an action receives notice of the substance

party when

new claim

acopy

to

statute of limitations. It did not say that notice was provided by way of a letter or phone call.
Likewise, our Supreme Court has held that a conversation with the manager of the defendant
which included filling out documentation concerning the injury and email correspondence between
the plaintiff and the insurer for the defendant was not sufficient notice. Ketterling v. Burger King,
Corp., 152 Idaho 555,558,272 P.3d 527 (2012). There the Court stated that even if the manager

and insurance agent had notice of the injury, "that would not be sufficient to impart 'notice of the
institution of the action"' as required by IRCP 15. Id. The Court ruled that "Rule 15(c) speaks of
notice of the institution of the action, rather than learning of the plaintiff's injury and desire to be
compensated for the same. Whether HB Boys had notice ofpolential litigation, or whether it would
be prejudiced in defending against any action, is not the relevant inquiry." Id. Clearly, Idaho law
on the subject does not comport with Plaintiffs' argument in this case.
Plaintiffs also contend that by participating in the Prelitigation Screening process, the health
care defendants received sufficient notice of the commencement of a medical negligence action
against them. The prelitigation screening procedure was designed specifically for the purpose of
encouraging consideration of claims informally and without the necessity oflitigation. See, Idaho
Code §6-1005. 5 As such, the process was never designed for the purpose of giving notice to a party

5

Prelitigation screening panel proceedings are not a civil lawsuit, nor are they an
adjunct to a civil lawsuit. They are entirely separate informal and non-binding proceedings in which
the rules of evidence do not apply, no record is kept, there is no cross-examination or rebuttal, there
is no appeal, and the proceedings are closed even to the parties themselves except when they are
presenting their own testimony and argument. Rudd v..Merritt, 138 Idaho 526, 537, 66 P.3d 230
(2003).
8
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It was designed to
commencement
or even

notice

If the
action

the substance of an action, there would be no need to toll the statute of

limitations during the process only to allow the statute to begin running again once the procedure
was completed which is exactly how the process works.
Furthermore, in this particular case, very little information was provided by Plaintiffs to the
health care defendants through the prelitigation process. The application itself was very vague and
consisted of 37 words total to describe the allegations against the health care providers. Many
prelitigation applications are filed and hearings completed which never spawn formal litigation.
Filing a request for or participating in a prelitigation screening panel does not equate to filing a
lawsuit against a party or even giving a potential party sufficient notice that a law suit will be
commenced within the statutory time. Additionally, Plaintiffs specifically advised Dr. Taylor that
they did not want or intend to file suit against him. See, Taylor Affidavit, p. 2, para. 5. Plaintiffs
have not challenged Dr. Taylor's statement. Even under Plaintiffs' reading of Terra-West, they
failed to give Dr. Taylor proper notice of the initiation or commencement of a medical negligence
claim against him prior to December 19, 2013.
2.

Idaho State Law Applies.

In the brief which Plaintiffs incorporate by reference, they encourage the Court to apply
federal law or the law of other jurisdictions with regard to when an action is commenced. Such a
request is inappropriate when Idaho law is clear on the subject matter at issue. Terra-West and

9
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clearly

to the

1s no

to apply the

The fact that the original and first amended complaints were removed to

some other

court does

not require this Court to apply federal law. In light of the fact that this case was removed to federal
court pursuant to diversity of citizenship, the federal court was required to refer to Idaho law in
deciding the issue of whether the action was timely commenced against the health care defendants.
For example, in the brief Plaintiffs incorporated by reference, they rely heavily on the First Circuit's
decision in Nett v. Gross, 306 F.3d 1153 (2002). There, the First Circuit determined that " .. .it was
unclear under Massachusetts law whether the filing of a motion for leave to amend constitutes the
commencement of the action for purposes of the statute of repose, or, as the district court held, the
amended complaint itself must be filed within the statutory period." Id. at 1155. As such, the First
Circuit certified the question to the Massachusetts Supreme Court and then applied the
Massachusetts law as dictated by the highest court of that state. Idaho law should be applied to this
case rather than ignored as suggested by Plaintiffs. 6

6

The other federal cases cited by Plaintiffs in their incorporated brief can also be
distinguished. Rademaker was federal question case under the Merchant Marine Act of 1920;
Korwek was a federal antitrust case and it was a motion to intervene not amend the complaint.
Sheets was a claim under the Federal 1933 Securities Act. F1ood was a 1983 action and it applied
North Carolina law. lvfauney was a North Carolina state case that added a claim not a new
defendant. Northwestern was a diversity action but the amendment was to add a new claim not a
new party. However, it applied New York state law. Derdiarian was a federal question case under
Section 11 of the 1933 Securities Act it also was an amendment to add a claim not a new defendant.
!vfason was also a federal question case alleging claims under 18 USC 1962 and RJCO. In Re
Integrated was a federal question case under the 1933 Securities Act along with bankruptcy issues.
Gloster was apparently a diversity case involving wrongful death with a potential claim under the
Federal Employers Liability Act. The court simply relied on Federal Rule 5 in rendering its
decision. It did not apply Pennsylvania state law as it should have. Pennsylvania law is clear that
it is the filing of the complaint, not the filing of a motion to amend that "commences an action." See
10
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CONCLUSION
1s no

statute

is no dispute that Plaintiffs' original and

case

on

9,

13

amended complaints did not name Dr. Taylor

nor did those pleadings state a claim for medical negligence. There is no dispute that on December
10, 2013, Plaintiffs filed in federal court a motion to amend their complaint again with a proposed
second amended complaint attached to the motion. There is no dispute that Plaintiffs filed a second
amended complaint in federal court on January 16, 2014-nearly one month after the statute expired.
There is no dispute that Dr. Taylor was not served with a copy of the motion to amend or the
proposed second amended complaint. There is no dispute that Dr. Taylor was first served with the
Second Amended Complaint on March 21, 2014.
Based upon the facts of this case, both Terra-West and Griggs demand that the action against
Dr. Taylor be dismissed. To hold otherwise would be contrary to the purposes of Idaho Code §5219. Therefore, Dr. Taylor respectfully requests that the claim against him contained in the Second
Amended Complaint be dismissed with prejudice as it is time barred by Idaho Code §5-219(4).
Dated this 22°d day of April, 2014.

Aivazogulou v. Drever Furnaces, 613 A.2d 595 (Superior Ct. PA 1992); Schach v. Ford Afotor Co.,
210 FRD 522 (MD PA 2002). Had Gloster properly applied Pennsylvania state law, the outcome
would have been different.
11
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

CAROL ENGLISH and ERIC ENGLISH,
wife and husband,

Case No. CV-2013-4868
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
MEDICAL DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
V.

COOK IN CORPORATED, and Indiana
Corporation; COOK MEDICAL
INCORPORATED, and Indiana
Corporation; COOK MEDICAL
TECHNOLOGIES, LLC; and Indiana
LLC; JAMES TAYLOR, D.O.;
EASTERN IDAHO HEAL TH
SERVICES, INC. dba EASTERN IDAHO
REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, an
Idaho Corporation; and DOES 1-20,
Defendants.

I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
Caro 1and Eric English ("Plaintiffs") allege that on September 17, 2011, Eastern Idaho Health
Services, Inc. ("EIRMC") and Dr. James Taylor ("Dr. Taylor") (collectively referred to as the
"Medical Defendants") committed medical negligence that injured Carol while using a particular
medical device. On September 13, 2013, Plaintiffs filed this suit against Cook Incorporated; Cook
Medical Incorporated; Cook Medical Technologies, LLC; and Does 1-20 (the "Cook Defendants")
alleging products liability theories involving the medical device used on September 17, 20 I I. On

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
English v. Cook Inc., etal, cv-2013-4868

September 16, 201

the Idaho State Board of Medicine received Plaintiffs' claim for medical
On September 1

filed an

complaint.

Plaintiffs did not include the Medical Defendants nor any medical negligence theories in either of
these complaints.
On October 31, 2013, the Cook Defendants filed a Notice of Removal that removed this state
action to federal court based on diversity of citizenship. On December 10, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a
Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Second
Amended Complaint was not served upon the Medical Defendants. On January 16, 2014, the federal
court granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint and Plaintiffs filed
their Second Amended Complaint the same day.

In Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint,

Plaintiffs' claimed medical negligence and named the Medical Defendants.
On January 17, 2014, Plaintiffs and Cook Defendants stipulated that the Second Amended
Complaint deprived the federal court of jurisdiction. On January 21, 2014, the federal court
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction and the case was remanded back to Idaho State Court. On
January 27, 2014, Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint, which was already filed in
federal court, in the Idaho state action. On February 25, 2014, EIRMC was served with Plaintiffs'
Second Amended Complaint. Dr. Taylor was served on March 21, 2014.
On March 14, 2014, EIRMC filed Defendant Eastern Idaho Health Services, Inc. DBA
Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center's Motion for Summary Judgment ("EIRMC's Motion for
Summary Judgment"). On April 4, 2014, Dr. Taylor filed Defendant James Taylor, D.O.'s First
Motion for Summary Judgment ("Dr. Taylor's Motion for Summary Judgment"). Both motions for
summary judgment have the same relevant facts, make nearly identical arguments, and Plaintiffs
arguments apply to both parties. Therefore, this Court will address the motions together.
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
English v. Cook Inc., eta!, cv-2013-4868
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II.
ST AND ARD OF REVIEW
&

, 119

51

51

1 808

851,

(1991), the

Supreme Court outlined the standard for granting or denying a motion for summary judgment,
staying:
It is well established that a motion for summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith

if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Upon a motion for summary
judgment, all controverted facts are liberally construed in favor of the non-moving
party. Likewise, all reasonable inferences which can be made from the record shall
be made in favor of the party resisting the motion. The burden at all times is upon the
moving party to prove the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. However, the
plaintiffs case must be anchored in something more than speculation and a mere
scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue. If the record contains
conflicting inferences or reasonable minds might reach different conclusions, a
summary judgment must be denied. All doubts are to be resolved against the moving
party, and the motion must be denied if the evidence is such that conflicting
inferences may be drawn therefrom, and if reasonable people might reach different
conclusions.
(Internal citations and quotations omitted).
III.
ANALYSIS

In a malpractice action, the injured party has two years from the date that the cause of action
accrued to commence an action. LC. §5-219(4). However, the statute oflimitations is tolled during
pre-litigation proceedings for medical malpractice actions. LC. §6-1005. In relevant part, LC. §61005 says "the applicable statute of limitations shall be tolled and not be deemed to run during the
time that such a claim is pending before such a panel and for thirty (30) days thereafter."
Plaintiffs' complaint alleges that the injury occurred on September 17, 2011. On September
16, 2013, the Idaho State Board of Medicine received Plaintiffs' pre-litigations screening request.
On November 18, 2013, the pre-litigation screening panel filed its decision with the Idaho State
OPINION ANO ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
English v. Cook Inc., etal, cv-2013-4868
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Medicine. Combined, these actions caused the applicable statute of limitations to be
1 2013. All
Plaintiffs filed

Motion for

this is
to

correct

a Second Amended Complaint on December 10,

2013, but did not file the actual Second Amended Complaint until January 16, 2014. Therefore the
issue before this Court is whether the December 10, 2013, filing of Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to
File a Second Amended Complaint commenced the action against the Medical Defendants.
LR.C.P. 3(a) governs the commencement of civil actions and states, "a civil action is
commenced by the filing of a complaint, petition or application with the court." In the case of a
third-party complaint, an action is still commenced by the filing of a complaint. I.R.C.P. 3(a);
Griggs v. Nash, 116 Idaho 228, 234, 775 P.2d 120, 126 (1989). However, the Supreme Court

addressed the flexibility of I.R.C.P. 3(a) in the context of requests for leave to file amended
complaints in Terra-W, Inc. v. Idaho Mut. Trust, LLC, 150 Idaho 393, 247 P.3d 620 (2010). In
Terra-W, Inc. v. Idaho Mut. Trust, LLC, the plaintiff filed a mechanics lien against the subject

property for work performed in improving the land. The defendant had an interest in the property
and filed a motion to dismiss the first mechanics lien. Id. at 395,247 P.3d at 622. The court granted
the motion to dismiss, but the defendant was not dismissed from the law suit. Id. Before the statute
of limitations ran, the plaintiff filed motion for leave to file a second mechanics lien along with a
copy of the proposed lien. Id. The district court granted the request eight months after the expiration
of the statute of limitations. Id. Idaho Mutual appealed and the Supreme Court upheld the district
court on the grounds that the "filing of the motion to amend the complaint commenced proceedings
pursuant to Idaho's mechanic's lien statute." Id. at 396,247 P.3d at 623.
However, the Supreme Court qualified this holding by saying that Idaho Mutual, as a party to
the suit, had notice of the proposed amendment because the request and proposed amendment were
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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upon Idaho Mutual.

at 399,247 P.3d at 626. The Supreme Court conditioned the relaxing
on

proposed amendment.

defendants having

the substance

the

Id The Supreme Court explained that the substance of the proposed

amendment was either a copy of the proposed amendment or sufficiently descriptive text included in
the amendment itself. Id The Court then reasoned that because the third-party is not served with the
request for leave to file an amended complaint under LR.C.P. 14(a), the third-party has no notice of
the pending action. Id at 400,247 P.3d at 627.
While discussing Griggs v. Nash, the Supreme Court explained that a third-party complaint is
"categorically different than a motion to amend to add a new claim against a party who is already
part of the action." Terra-W, Inc. at 399, 247 P.3d at 626. While not directly holding such, the
suggested Court also suggested that filing a separate action and attempting to consolidate might be
the better course of action when dealing with third-party complaints. Id.
The Medical Defendants argue that under Griggs v. Nash and Terra-W, Inc. v. Idaho Mut.

Trust, LLC the statute of limitations expired while Plaintiffs December 10, 2013, Motion for Leave
to File Second Amended Complaint was pending. Plaintiffs argue that under Terra-W, Inc., the
statute oflimitations requirements were satisfied by the filing of Motion for Leave to File a Second
Amended Complaint.
The record shows that Plaintiffs did not meet the LR.C.P. 3(a) filing requirements outlined in

Griggs. Id. at 234, 775 P.2d at 126. While this case has some similarities with Terra-W, Inc., the
facts of this case lack certain key elements that would allow this Court to apply the relaxed filing
requirement in Terra-W, Inc.
In the present case, as in Terra W, Inc., Plaintiffs filed their motion before the expiration of
the statute oflimitations and attached the proposed amended complaint. However, unlike Terra-W,
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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did not serve the Medical Defendants with a copy of the proposed amern1ed complaint
statute

of the

3(a) filing requirement on the defendants having notice of the substance of the proposed
amendment. Terra-W, Inc. at 399, 247 P.3d at 626. The Supreme Court explained that the
substance of the proposed amendment was either a copy of the proposed amendment or sufficiently
descriptive text included in the amendment itself. Id. In light of the Supreme Court's language in

Terra-W, Inc. and Plaintiffs' failure to serve the Medical Defendants before the expiration of the
statute of limitations, this Court cannot extend the Terra-W, Inc. holding to the present facts.
Plaintiffs argue that by requiring that Defendants have actual notice before the expiration of
the statute of limitations, this Court would place additional burdens on Plaintiffs that are not present
in original filings. Plaintiffs base this argument on the fact that a defendant to the original claim
need only be served within six months of the filing, which would permit the defendant discovering
liability after the statute of limitations.
Even though the issue of third-party complaints was not before the court in Terra-W, Inc.,
the Supreme Court suggested that third-party complaints are a different matter. The foundation for
this distinction appears to be notice given to the proposed third-parties. The Supreme Court
specified that notice prior to the expiration of the statute oflimitations was required for the relaxing
of the I.R.C.P. 3(a) filing requirement. Terra-W, Inc. at 399, 247 P.3d 626. While the Supreme
Court did not specify the reasoning for this requirement, justice suggests to enjoy this benefit, the
plaintiff must take steps to mitigate damage potentially suffered by the potential defendant.
This conclusion is not unjust because Plaintiffs had the ability to file a new action against the
Medical Defendants that would have guaranteed preservation of Plaintiffs' claim. On the same note,
a simple request for leave to amend does not put potential third-parties on notice that they are
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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action.

court is not bound to grant the request. The request only gives the
become

not

any

liability.
Therefore, Plaintiffs' December 10, 2013, Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended
Complaint did not commence the action and Plaintiffs did not commence the action until after the
statute of limitations expired.
IV.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Eastern Idaho Health Services, Inc. DBA Eastern Idaho Regional
Medical Center's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. James Taylor, D.O.'sFirstMotion
for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Counsel for Defendants shall submit an appropriate form of
judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated this _ _ day of June, 2014.
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COME NOW Plaintiffs Carol English and Eric English ("Plaintiffs"), and move
Court, pursuant

Rule 11(a)(2)(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure to

Opinion and Order Granting Medical Defendants' Motions
Judgment issued on June 23,

2014

("Opinion").

I.
On or about March

Summary

14, 2014,

INTRODUCTION
Defendant Eastern Idaho Health Services, Inc., dba

Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center ("EIRMC") filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment against Plaintiffs asserting that the statute of limitations had passed on
Plaintiffs' claims against EIRMC. Subsequently, on April

4, 2014,

Defendant James

Taylor, D.O. ("Taylor") filed his own Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiffs,
again on the premise that Plaintiffs' claims were precluded by the statute of limitations.
Oral arguments on EIRMC and Taylor's (collectively "Medical Defendants") Motions for
Summary Judgment were held on May 5,

2014,

and the Court issued its Opinion and

Order Granting Medical Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment on June

23, 2014

("Opinion"). Plaintiffs now move this Court to reconsider its Opinion. Plaintiffs hereby
incorporate the facts previously raised to the Court in the parties' briefing on the
Motions for Summary Judgment, but additionally notes that on April 9,

2014,

the

federal court entered an order clarifying that Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint
"was effectively filed on December

10, 2013,

Unopposed Motion to Amend." (See Federal Dkt.

2

the date it was filed with Plaintiffs'
20,

attached at Exhibit A).

II.

STANDARD
explained the

applicable to a motion for

reconsideration as follows:
The district court has no discretion on whether to entertain a
motion for reconsideration pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
11(a)(2)(B). On a motion for reconsideration, the court must consider any
new admissible evidence or authority bearing on the correctness of an
interlocutory order. However, a motion for reconsideration need not be
supported by any new evidence or new authority. When deciding a motion
for reconsideration, the district court must apply the same standard of
review that the court applied when deciding the original order that is being
reconsidered; in other words, if the original order was a matter within the
trial court's discretion, then so is the decision to grant or deny the motion
for reconsideration, and if the original order was governed by a different
standard, then that standard applies to the motion for reconsideration.

Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276, 281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012) (internal citations
omitted).
III.

ARGUMENf

A. Federal Law Requires that Medical Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment Should Have Been Denied.
1.

The Question of When the Amended Complaint was Deemed Filed
is a Procedural Question, not a Question of Substantive Law, and is
Therefore Governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

At the time Plaintiffs brought their Motion to Amend, this case was pending in
federal court. Judge Lodge ordered that the Second Amended Complaint was deemed
filed on December 10, 2013. However, this Court failed to acknowledge or recognize the
federal court's order with no analysis as to whether the underlying issue is procedural or
substantive. Critical to the determination of when the Second Amended Complaint
adding the Medical Defendants as defendants to the action was deemed filed is whether
the question of filing of the Second Amended Complaint is a matter of procedure or

3
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substantive law.

The Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint was filed

2013, while this matter was pending
2014, the federal court granted Plaintiffs' Motion for

federal court.
to

January 16,

Second Amended

Complaint and Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint, which included the
Medical Defendants, the same day. Later, when questions arose regarding the date that
the Second Amended Complaint was deemed filed, Judge Lodge entered an Order
clarifying that "Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint was effectively filed on December
10, 2013, the date it was filed with Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion to Amend." (Federal
Dkt. 20). Judge Lodge's clarification reflects standard procedural law in federal court
that an amended complaint is deemed filed on the day the motion to amend is filed. See

Mayes v. A&P Info. Sys., Inc., 867 F.2d 1172, 1173 (8th Cir. 1989); Buller v. Owner
Operator Ind. Driver Risk Retention Group, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 768, 777 (S.D. Ill.
2006)(collecting federal court cases holding amended complaint is deemed filed when
motion to amend is filed).
The issue of when the action against Medical Defendants commenced is a procedural
issue. In fact, this Court acknowledges in its Opinion, the procedural nature of the issue
by holding Medical Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is not unjust because
"Plaintiffs had the ability to file a new action against the Medical Defendants that would
have guaranteed preservation of Plaintiffs' claim."

(Opinion, p. 6). As the Court also

notes in its Opinion, the Idaho Supreme Court acknowledged as much in Terra-West,

Inc. v. Idaho Mutual Trust, LLC, 150 Idaho 393, 247 P.3d 620 (2010), where the
"[Idaho Supreme] Court also suggested that filing a separate action and attempting to
consolidate might be the better course of action when dealing with third-party
complaints." (Opinion, p. 5 (citing Terra-West at 399, 247 P.3d at 626)). In other
4
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Court states that had Plaintiffs followed a different procedure (filing a new
,,.,,,., .. instead of moving for leave to amend), Plaintiffs' claims would have survived. As
•n~un,·-...

below, because the key issue in determining whether Plaintiffs'

had

commenced was a matter of procedure, and because this matter was pending before the
federal court at the time Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Leave to File Second Amended
Complaint with the attached Second Amended Complaint, the Court must apply federal
procedural law.
2.

Because when the Action "Commenced" is a Procedural Matter
Governed by Rule 3 of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, Federal
Law Applies.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure automatically apply "in all civil actions and
proceedings in the United States district courts." Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (emphasis added); see

also Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 699-700, 99 S.Ct. 2545, 61 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979).
"It is, of course, well-settled that in a suit based on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction

the federal courts apply federal law as to the matters of procedure but the substantive
law of the relevant state." Hiatt v. Wadlow, 75 F.3d 1252, 1255 (8th Cir. 1996)(citing Erie

R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed.1188 (1938)). "When a
situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules, the question facing the Court is a far cry
from the typical relatively unguided Erie choice: the court has been instructed to apply
the Federal Rule, and can refuse to do so only if the Advisory Committee, this Court, and
Congress erred in their prima facie judgment that the Rule in question transgresses
neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions." Hanna v. Plumer,
380 U.S. 460, 471, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 1144 (1965). "Thus, the full-blown Erie analysis-first
determining whether a matter is substantive or procedural and then applying state law
on substantive matters - does not apply if the matter in question is covered by a Federal
5
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Rule of Civil Procedure." Hiatt, 75 F.3d at 1258. Consequently, because this action was
federal court at the time the Motion

Leave to

Second Amended

Complaint and the Second Amended Complaint were filed, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure must be applied.

3. Federal Procedural Law Dictates that an Action "Commences"
Against a Defendant Added to an Action Through an Amended
Complaint at the Time the Motion for Leave is Filed.
The wording of Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 3 of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure regarding when an action is "commenced" is nearly
identical. While Idaho courts have arguably addressed when an action "commences"
under Rule 3 against a third-party defendant, Idaho courts have not yet directly
addressed the time at which an action commences as against a defendant which was not
previously a party to an existing suit. 1 The federal courts, however, have addressed this
very issue. Under the interpretation of Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an
amended complaint which adds additional defendants is deemed filed on the date on
which the Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint is filed. In fact, in Terra-West,
the Idaho Supreme Court acknowledged, citing Mayes v. AT&T Info. Sys., Inc., 867 F.2d
1172,

1173 (8th Cir. 1989) as an example, that under Rule 3 of the Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure, "the interplay between F.R.C.P. 3 and the effect of filing a motion for leave to
amend a complaint supports the conclusion that a motion for leave to amend
commences proceedings." Terra-West, Inc. v. Idaho Mutual Trust, LLC, 150 Idaho 393,
398, 247 P.3d 620, 625 (2010). Importantly, in Mayes, the question in front of the
It should be noted that in Griggs v. Nash, 116 Idaho 228, 775 P.2d 120 (1989) the Idaho
Supreme Court provides no analysis as to why it determined that, even though the plaintiff
brought a motion for leave to file a third-party complaint within the statute of limitations
period, the complaint was untimely because the actual third-party complaint itself was not filed
until after the court ruled on the motion for leave eight months later.
1
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Eighth Circuit regarding when an action "commences" under Rule 3 was nearly identical
question currently before this Court. In Mayes, the plaintiff timely filed a motion
~u,,~u ......

to

her union, an indispensable party, to the lawsuit as a defendant. The

district court granted her motion, and the plaintiff filed her amended complaint, which,
by that time, was beyond the applicable statute of limitations. The union subsequently
moved for summary judgment because the amended complaint itself was filed six days
after the statute of limitations. The district court granted the union's motion, and the
suit was subsequently dismissed. The Eighth Circuit overturned the decision, stating:
"A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court."
Amended complaints may not be filed until the court has ordered leave to
do so. A number of courts have addressed the situation where the petition
for leave to amend the complaint has been filed prior to expiration of the
statute of limitations, while the entry of the court order and the filing of
the amended complaint have occurred after the limitations period has
expired. In such cases, the amended complaint is deemed filed within the
limitations period.

Mayes, 867 F.2d 1172, 1173 (8th Cir. 1989)(internal citations omitted); Buller v. Owner
Operator Ind. Driver Risk Retention Group, Inc., 461 F.Supp.2d 768, 777 (S.D. Ill.
2006)(collecting federal court cases holding amended complaint is deemed filed when
motion to amended is filed). Under Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an
action against a defendant not previously a party to the litigation is considered to have
"commenced" at the time the motion for leave to amend was filed, not at the time when
the amended complaint is subsequently filed after the grant of leave to amend by the
court.
Because Idaho has never addressed the issue of when an action "commences"
with regard to a defendant added through an amended complaint filed as a result of a
motion for leave to amend, there is no conflict with the federal procedure which has

7
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directly addressed this question. Because there is no conflict with federal procedural
on this issue, federal procedural law must be applied. See National Equip. Rental,

v. Szukhent,

311,

316, 84

414,

11

procedure requires that this Court recognize that the date upon which the action
"commenced" against the Medical Defendants was December 10, 2013, the date upon
which the Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint was filed. Judge Lodge,
through his Order dated April 9, 2014, clarifying his Order on Plaintiffs Motion for
Leave to Amend, also affirmatively stated, in comport with federal courts' interpretation
of Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that Plaintiffs' Second Amended
Complaint was "effectively filed on December 10, 2013, the date it was filed with
Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion to Amend." (Federal Dkt. 20, Ex. A). Because December
10, 2013, was within the statute of limitations period, the action against Medical
Defendants was "commenced" timely, and the Court should have denied Medical
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

4. Even if There was a Question as to Whether Rule 3 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and its Interpretation Under Case Law
Applied, Analysis Under the Erie Doctrine Requires that, When a
Direct Conflict Between Idaho Law and Federal Law Regarding
When an Action "Commences" Against a Defendant Added to an
Action Through an Amended Complaint Arises with Regard to a
Procedural Issue, Federal Law Trumps.
A situation similar to the matter before this Court was examined by the United States
Supreme Court in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965).
In Hanna, the question at issue was whether the service provisions prescribed by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rather than by state law, should be applied in a
diversity action.

While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allowed service by

"delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to [a defendant] personally or
8
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by leaving copies thereof at his dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person

age and discretion then residing therein," the Massachusetts service statute
service

delivery

hand.

at 461-62, 85

1138-39. The

petitioner, who filed her claim in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Massachusetts, served her complaint pursuant to the service provisions of the federal
rule of civil procedure, and the defendant subsequently filed a motion for summary
judgment based upon failure to properly serve under Massachusetts law. The District
Court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Ultimately, the United
States Supreme Court overturned the lower court's ruling, holding that the federal rule
of procedure trumped based upon the Constitution's grant of power over federal
procedure and Congress's exercise of that power in the Enabling Act. Id. 380 U.S. at
473-74, 85 S.Ct. at 1145. In discussing the application of the Erie doctrine in that case,
the U.S. Supreme Court noted that the crux of the Erie doctrine, like the Rules Enabling
Act (28 U.S.C. § 2072), is that federal courts are to apply state substantive law and
federal procedural law. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 465, 85 S.Ct. at 1141. The Court noted,
citing to Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 65 S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed.
2079, (1945), that "the question is not whether a statute of limitations is deemed a
matter of 'procedure' in some sense.

The question is ... does it significantly affect the

result of a litigation for a federal court to disregard a law of a State that would be
controlling in an action upon the same claim by the same parties in a State court?" It
answered the question in the case of Hanna as follows:
The difference between the conclusion that the Massachusetts rule is
applicable, and the conclusion that it is not, is of course at this point
'outcome-determinative' in the sense that if we hold the state rule to apply,
respondent prevails, whereas if we hold that Rule 4(d)(1) governs, the
litigation will continue. But in this sense every procedural variation is
9
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'outcome-determinative.' For example, having brought suit in federal
court, a plaintiff cannot then insist on the right to file subsequent
pleadings in accord with the time limits applicable
state courts, even
though enforcement of the federal time table will, if he continues to insist
that he must meet only the state time limit, result in determination of the
controversy against him. So it is here. Though choice of the federal or
state rule will at this point have a marked effect upon the outcome of the
litigation, the difference between the two rules would be of scant, if any
relevance to the choice of forum. Petitioner, in choosing her forum, was
not presented with a situation where application of the state rule would
wholly bar recovery; rather adherence to the state rule would have resulted
only in altering the way in which process was served.

Hanna, 380 U.S. 468-69, 85 S.Ct. at 1142-42.
Likewise, in this case, it is clear that when an action "commences" is a procedural
issue, as explained above.

Just as in the case of Hanna, where the petitioner, in

choosing her forum, was not presented with a situation where application of the state
rule would wholly bar recover, but rather would have merely altered the way in which
process was served, Plaintiffs in this case were not presented with a situation where
application of the state rule would wholly bar recovery - rather it would simply impact
the means by which Plaintiffs went about adding Medical Defendants.

Under Erie

analysis, when an action "commences" for the purposes of Rule 3 is a procedural issue,
and therefore Federal law must be applied.
It should be noted that Walker v. Armco Steel Corporation, 446 U.S. 740, 100 S.Ct.

1978 (1980) does not answer or address the question at issue here, because the service
requirements at issue in that case were part of a comprehensive statutory scheme which
the Court found to be substantive, as "the Oklahoma statute is a statement of a
substantive decision by that State that actual service on, and accordingly actual notice
by, the defendant is an integral part of the several policies served by the statute of
limitations." Walker, 446 U.S. 751, 100 S.Ct. 1985. Unlike Walker, here, pursuant to
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Court's opinion and the dicta found in Terra-West, Plaintiffs could have followed a
more cumbersome procedure to "commence" the action against Medical
~~~AA~~u,,~

as

the same date upon which Plaintiffs filed

Motion

to File

Second Amended Complaint, and, the Court states, such action would have been timely
under the statute of limitations. There was no alternative method of service in Walker
which would have fulfilled the service requirements to save the action from being barred
by the statute of limitations, i.e., it presented a substantive issue of state law. Walker is
distinguishable from the situation at hand, and Hanna must be applied.
Under Federal Law, and under Judge Lodge's ruling, the Second Amended
Complaint adding Medical Defendants to the action was deemed filed on December 10,
2013, the date on which the Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint was
filed.

This date was well within the statute of limitations.

Consequently, Medical

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment should have been denied.

B. Even if This Situation Did Not Require the Application of Federal Law,
Idaho Law Requires that Medical Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment Not Be Granted.
1.

Cases Should Be Decided on their Merits Whenever Possible.

Judicial policy in Idaho has long been that controversies should be determined and
disposed of each on their own particular facts and as substantial justice may require. As
the Idaho Supreme Court stated in Stoner v. Turner, 73 Idaho 117, 121, 247 P.2d 469,
471 (1952):
The object of statutes and rules regulating procedure in the courts is to
promote the administration of justice. Those statutes and rules which fix
the time within which procedural rights are to be asserted are intended to
expedite the disposition of causes to the end that justice will not be denied
by inexcusable and unnecessary delay. But, except as to those which are
mandatory or jurisdictional, procedural regulations should not be so
11
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applied as to defeat their primary purpose, that is, the disposition of
causes upon their substantial merits without delay or prejudice.
admittedly, the Court cannot ignore mandatory or jurisdictional procedural
requirements, in this case, the Court's determination that it was the filing of the Second
Amended Complaint itself, not the filing of the Motion for Leave to File Second
Amended Complaint, that "commenced" the action against Medical Defendants, violates
Idaho policy that cases be decided on their merits and that procedural regulations
should not be applied so as to defeat their purpose of disposition of cases on their
merits. As the Court notes in its decision, Plaintiffs' claims against Medical Defendants
would have survived had Plaintiffs filed a separate complaint and then attempted to
consolidate the case with the case already pending before the Court against the Cook
Defendants. Not only does this procedural technicality violate public policy favoring
disposition of cases on their merits, it also violates the public policy of judicial efficiency.
Certainly requiring Plaintiffs to file a separate case, which in all likelihood would be
assigned to a different judge, would bog down the system even more, and result in
additional briefing and hearings associated with the motion to consolidate which would
necessarily follow, affecting not one, but two judge's dockets.
Moreover, this alternative procedure would not have been allowable or
reasonable in federal court, where the case lied at the time. Plaintiffs could not file a
case against the Medical Defendants and seek consolidation. There is no procedure to
consolidate a state action with a federal court action. Moreover, requiring this procedure
would provide the Medical Defendants with the same "notice" they received when the
Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint was filed. Plaintiffs would have
had no obligation to serve the Second Amended Complaint in a new action to comply

12

3

with the statute of limitations. It is nonsensical to require a costly and cumbersome
procedure that provides the same "notice" to the Medical Defendants. Dismissal of

·-u·~···~

-.,i,uu.1..:,

against Medical Defendants on a procedural technicality violates public

policy favoring resolution of cases on their merits and judicial efficiency.
2.

Medical Defendants Had Adequate Notice.

The main basis for the Court's decision in the Opinion revolves around whether
Medical Defendants had notice of the fact they were being brought into the lawsuit. The
Court based this decision largely on Griggs v. Equity Mortgage Servs. Inc., 116 Idaho
228, 234, 775 P.2d 120, 126 (1989), in which the Idaho Supreme Court held, without
explanation, that it was the filing of a third-party complaint, not the filing of the motion
for

leave

associated

with

the

third-party

complaint,

that

constituted

the

"commencement" of the action against the third-party defendant. The Idaho Supreme
Court noted in dicta in Terra-West that the reason for the Court's decision in Griggs
had to do with the lack of notice to the third-party defendant. There is an important
distinction between Griggs and this matter, however, because Griggs was not a medical
malpractice action, and therefore the third-party defendant would not have had the
notice provided by the statutorily required Pre-litigation Screening Panel before the
Idaho Board of Medicine. The purpose of the pre-litigation screening panel is for the
panel to receive evidence concerning the plaintiffs claim and at the close of the
proceedings provide the parties comments and observations with respect to the dispute.

James v. Buck, 111 Idaho 708, 709, 727 P.2d 1136, 1137 (1986). Consequently, by its
very nature, the parties, including the defendant parties, are given notice of the
plaintiffs claim, and furthermore, the fact that the screening panel is called a "prelitigation" screening panel indicates that the next step in the process is to proceed with
13
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litigation. Medical Defendants had actual notice of the claims at issue and Plaintiffs'
move forward with the litigation of
""'·Hu.;-,

claims through the pre-litigation

panel process. Because of the pre-litigation screening process, this case is

distinguishable from Griggs.

Therefore, even if Idaho law is applied, Medical

Defendants had notice of the claims brought against it as of at least November 18,
when the pre-litigation screening panel rendered its decision.

2013,

Consequently, if the

timeliness of the commencement of an action is dependent upon when a party received
notice of the claims being brought against it, then the action "commenced" as of at least
November 18, 2013.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant their
Motion for Reconsideration.

itv-,

Dated this

:f day of July, 2014

HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO,

~QA~~~~DeAnneCasperSOll

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this~of July, 2014, I caused a true and correct copy of the
be
facsimile on the follmving:
J. Michael Wheiler
Richard R. Friess
THOMSEN HOLMAN WHEILER, PLLC
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Attorneys for Defendant James Taylor, D.O.
Marvin M. Smith
SMITH & BANKS PLLC
2010 Jennie Lee Dr.
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Attorneys for Defendant EIRMC
William Dryden
CraigYabui
ELAM&BURKE
251 E. Front St., Ste. 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701
Douglas B. King
Brian D. Burbrink
WOODEN & MCLAUGHLIN LLP
One Indiana Square, Ste. 1800
211 N. Pennsylvania
Indianapolis, IN 46204
Attorneys for Defendants Cook Incorporated, Cook Medical Incorporated, and Cook
Medical Technologies, LLC
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THE UNlTED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF

CAROL ENGLISH and ERIC ENGLISH,
wife and husband,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. 4:13-cv-00469-EJL
ORDER

vs.
COOK IN CORPORATED, an Indiana
corporation; COOK MEDICAL
IN CORPORATED, an Indiana
Corporation; COOK MEDICAL
TECHNOLOGIES, LCC, an Indiana
LLC, and DOES 1-20,
Defendants.

Before the Court is Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion to Clarify Docket Entry
Order 13 (Dkt. 19). Docket Entry Order 13 granted Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion
for leave to File Second Amended Complaint. Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiffs' Motion to
Clarify (Dkt. 19) and clarifies its Docket Entry Order 13. Specifically, Docket
Entry Order 13 did not address the effective commencement of the claims asserted
in the Second Amended Complaint filed with Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion to
Amend. The Court hereby clarifies that Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint
was effectively filed on December 10, 2013, the date it was filed with Plaintiffs'
Unopposed Motion to Amend (Dkt. 10).

ORDER TO REMAND CASE TO STATE COURT

4

l
Exhibit "A"

Case 4:13-cv-O

-EJL

Document 20

Filed 04/09/
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SO ORDERED .
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DeAnne Casperson
dcasperson@holdenlegal.com
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO
1000 Riverwalk Dr., Ste. 200
Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0130

{ i; '

n , .. ,

Ralph L. Dewsnup (UT Bar #876)
rdews@dkolaw.com
David R. Olsen (UT Bar #2458)
dolse@dkolaw.com
Jessica A. Andrew (UT Bar #12433)
jandrew@dkolaw.com
DEWSNUP, KING & OLSEN
36 South State Street, Suite 2400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-0024
Telephone: (801) 533-0400
Facsimile: (801) 363-4218
(admitted pro hac vice)

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OFTHE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN ANDFOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
CAROL ENGLISH and ERIC ENGLISH,
wife and husband,

Case No. cv-2013-4868

Plaintiffs,

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

vs.
COOK INCORPORATED, an Indiana
corporation; COOK MEDICAL
INCORPORATED, an Indiana Corporation;
COOK MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,
an Indiana LLC; JAMES TAYLOR, D.O.;
EASTERN IDAHO HEALTH SERVICES,
INC. dba EASTERN IDAHO REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER, an Idaho Corporation;
and DOES 1-20,
Defendants.
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COME NOW Plaintiffs Carol English and Eric English ("Plaintiffs") by and
through

counsel of record, Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., and moves
reconsider

Opinion and Order Granting Medical Defendants' Motion for

Summary Judgment ("Opinion") issued on June 23,

2014

for the reasons set forth in the

Memorandum in Support file simultaneous herewith.

Dated this 7th day of July,

HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO,
P.L.L.C.

2014

~~s~='

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this ?1h day of July, 2014, I caused a true and correct copy of the
be served
facsimile on the following:
Michael Wheiler
Richard R. Friess
THOMSEN HOLMAN WHEILER, PLLC
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Attorneys for Defendant James Taylor, D.O.
Marvin M. Smith
SMITH & BANKS PLLC
2010 Jennie Lee Dr.
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Attorneys for Defendant EIRMC
William Dryden
CraigYabui
ELAM&BURKE
251 E. Front St., Ste. 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701
Douglas B. King
Brian D. Burbrink
WOODEN & MCLAUGHLIN LLP
One Indiana Square, Ste. 1800
211 N. Pennsylvania
Indianapolis, IN 46204
Attorneys for Defendants Cook Incorporated, Cook Medical Incorporated, and Cook
Medical Technologies, LLC

u~~~----DeAnne Casperson
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J. Michael Wheiler, ISB #3364
Richard Friess, ISB #7820
THOMSEN HOLMAN

2=58

·~·uuu,.., way

Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Telephone (208) 522-1230
Fax (208) 522-1277
wheiler@thwlaw.com
fri ess@thwlaw.com
Attorneys for Defendant James Taylor, D.O.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
CAROL ENGLISH

)

Case No. CV-2013-0004868-0C

)

Plaintiff,

)
)

V.

)

)
COOK IN CORPORATED, an Indiana
)
corporation; COOK MEDICAL
)
INCORPORATED, an Indiana Corporation;)
COOK MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES, LCC,)
an Indiana LLC; JAMES TAYLOR, D.O.; )
EASTERN IDAHO HEALTH SERVICES, )
INC. dba EASTERN IDAHO REGIONAL )
MEDICAL CENTER, an Idaho Corporation;)
and DOES 1-20;
)
)
Defendants.
)

JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL
WITH PREJUDICE

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and
Jury Demand against James Taylor, D.O. is dismissed with prejudice with Plaintiffs taking nothing
thereunder.
DATED this

J

day of July, 2014.

hindur1ing, District Judge
1-

JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE

45

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
Iam

elected and

the

Court of

Seventh

District of the State ofldaho, in and for the County of Bonneville; that I mailed [or delivered
by courthouse box] a copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE
to the following attorneys this

_D_ day of July, 2014.

DEANNE CASPERSON ESQ
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO PLLC
1000 RIVERW ALK DR - STE 200
PO BOX 50130
IDAHO FALLS ID 83405
WILLIAM G DRYDEN ESQ
ELAM&BURKE
251 E FRONT ST STE 300
PO BOX 1539
BOISE ID 83701
DOUGLAS B KING ESQ
WOODEN & MCLAUGHLIN LLP
ONE INDIANA SQUARE STE 1800
211 N PENNSYLVANIA
INDIANAPOLIS IN 46204
MARVIN M SMITH ESQ
SMITH & BANKS, PLLC
2010 JENNIE LEE DRIVE
IDAHO FALLS ID 83404

Clerk

By:

Jt·~

Deputy Cler

JMW/jd
7200.019\01 l judgment dismissal
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1
PLLC

5 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Telephone (208) 522-1230
Fax (208) 522-1277
wheiler@thwlaw.com
friess@thwlaw.com
Attorneys for Defendant James Taylor, D.O.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
CAROL ENGLISH and ERIC ENGLISH,
wife and husband,

)
)

Case No. CV-2013-0004868-0C

)

Plaintiffs,

)
)

V.

)

)

SECOND
AFFIDA VlT OF J.
MICHAEL WHEILER

COOK IN CORPORATED, an Indiana
)
corporation; COOK MEDICAL
)
IN CORPORATED, an Indiana Corporation; )
COOK MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES, LCC,)
an Indiana LLC; JAMES TAYLOR, D.O.; )
EASTERN IDAHO HEALTH SERVICES, )
INC. dba EASTERN IDAHO REGIONAL )
MEDICAL CENTER, an Idaho Corporation;)
and DOES 1-20;
)
)

Defendants.

)

STATE OF IDAHO

)
) ss.
County of Bonneville )
J. Michael V/heiler, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states:

SECOND AFFIDA VrT OF J. MICHAEL WHEILER
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Iaman

Defendant

the above captioned matter. I am over

8

2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit

is a true and correct copy of an

dated

9,

2014 by United States District Court for the District of Idaho.
3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy of Plaintiffs' unopposed

Motion to Clarify filed on March 4, 2014.
4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "C" is a true and correct copy of Judge Lodge's Order to

Remand Case to State Court dated January 21, 2014.
5.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "D" is a true and correct copy of the Stipulation between

Defendant Cook and Plaintiffs dated January 17, 2014.
Dated this

d:l!!day of August, 2014.

ND SWORN to on oath before me th s

Q-,

v~/

Nota
Residing at:
My Commission Expires:

2

SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF J MICHAEL WI1EILER

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I

certify that I am a duly licensed
in the State of Idaho, resident of and with my office
Idaho;
on thelJ.K day of August, 2014, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF JfMJCHAEL WHEILER to be served upon the following persons at the
addresses below their names either by depositing said document in the United States mail with the correct
postage thereon or by hand delivering or by transmitting by facsimile as set forth below.
DEANNE CASPERSON ESQ
[X] Mail
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO
[ ] Hand Delivery
1000 RIVER WALK DR STE 200
[ ] Facsimile: 208-523-9518
PO BOX 50130
[ ] E-Mail
lDAHO FALLS ID 83405-0 l 30
dcasperson(a)ho Iden legal .com
RALPH L DEWSNUP ESQ
DEWSNUP KING & OLSEN
36 SOUTH ST ATE ST STE 2400
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111-0024
rdews@dkolaw.com

[X] Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile: 801-363-4218
[ ] E-Mail

WILLIAM G DRYDEN ESQ
ELAM& BURKE
251 E FRONT ST STE 300
PO BOX 1539
BOISE ID 83701
wgd(a)elamburke.com

[X] Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ J Facsimile: 208-384-5844
[ ] E-Mail

DOUGLAS B KING ESQ
WOODEN & MCLAUGHLIN LLP
ONE INDIANA SQUARE STE 1800
21 l N PENNSYLVANIA
INDIANAPOLIS IN 46204
dking(a)woodmclaw.com

[X] Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile: 317-639-6444
[ ] E-Mail

MARVIN M SMlTH ESQ
SMITH & BANKS
2010 JENNIE LEE DR
lDAHO FALLS ID 83404
mmsmith(a)smithbanks.net

[X] Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile: 208-529-3065
[ ] E-Mail

By:
JMW
7200.019/013 2"d Wheiler Aff
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Case 4:13-cv-

L
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Filed 04/0s

1
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THE UNITED STATES DISTRJCT COURT
OF

CAROL ENGLISH and ERIC ENGLISH,
wife and husband,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. 4: lJ-cv-00469-EJL
ORDER

vs.
COOK IN CORPORA TED, an Indiana
corporation; COOK MEDICAL
INCORPORATED, an Indiana
Corporation; COOK MEDICAL
TECHNOLOGIES, LCC, an Indiana
LLC, and DOES 1-20,
Defendants.

Before the Court is Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion to Clarify Docket Entry
Order 13 (Dkt. 19). Docket Entry Order 13 granted Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion
for leave to File Second Amended Complaint. Pursuant to Rule 60(b )( 6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiffs' Motion to
Clarify (Dkt. 19) and clarifies its Docket Entry Order 13. Specifically, Docket
Entry Order 13 did not address the effective commencement of the claims asserted
in the Second Amended Complaint filed with Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion to
Amend. The Court hereby clarifies that Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint
was effectively filed on December 10, 2013, the date it was filed with Plaintiffs'
Unopposed Motion to Amend (Dkt. l 0).

ORDER TO REl\!fAND CASE TO STATE COURT

l

1

4:13-cv-

-EJL

Document

2

2

~,J.Lodg
United States District Judge

ORDER TO REMAND CASE TO STATE COURT - 2
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EXHIBIT "B"

Case 4:13-cv-

-EJL

19

1

3

&
Rivef\,\Talk
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0130
1000

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
CAROL ENGLISH and ERIC ENGLISH,
wife and husband,
RULE 60 MOTION TO CLARIFY
DOCKET ENTRY ORDER

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Case No. 4:13-cv-469-EJL
COOK INCORPORATED, an Indiana
corporation; COOK MEDICAL
INCORPORATED, an Indiana Corporation;
COOK MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,
an Indiana LLC; JAMES TAYLOR, D.O.;
EASTERN IDAHO HEALTH SERVICES,
INC. dba EASTERN IDAHO REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER, an Idaho Corporation;
and DOES 1-20,

Judge Edward J. Lodge

Defendants.

Plaintiffs hereby move the Court for an order clarifying that its Docket Entry
Order of January 16, 2014 1 relates back to the date on which Plaintiffs filed their Motion
for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint, 2 accompanied by a copy of the Second
Amended Complaint itself. This will have the effect of clarifying that the Complaint was
filed on December 10, 2013, instead of some other date. This clarification is consistent

1

Doc. 13.
Doc. 10, filed Dec.

10, 2013.

4

Case 4:13-cv-

-EJL

Document 19

03/04

Page 2

existing law as is explained in the accompanying Memorandum

and

Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes courts to clarify their
own orders at any time prior to the docketing of an appeal. No such appeal has been
docketed in this case, and Plaintiffs submit that the Court has continuing jurisdiction to
make the requested clarification.
Dated this 4th day of March,

2014.

HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO

/s/ DeAnne Casperson
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
on

I caused a true

correct

the foregoing RULE 60 MOTION TO CIARIFY DOCKET ENTRY ORDER to be
filed via ECF, which sent notice of the same to the following:
William Dryden
wgd@elamburke.com
Craig Yabui
cry@elamburke.com
ELAM&BURKE
251 E. Front St., Ste. 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701
Douglas B. King
dking@woodmclaw.com
Brian D. Burbrink
bburbrink@woodmclaw.com
WOODEN & MCLi\UGHLIN LLP
One Indiana Square, Ste. 1800
211 N. Pennsylvania
Indianapolis, IN 46204

A.ttomeysfor Defendants Cook Incorporated, Cook J,,fedical Incorporated, and Cook
Nledical Technologies, LLC

Isl

DeAnne Casperson

EXHIBIT "C"
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4:13-cv-

-EJL

Document 17

01/2:i,

Page 1

1

4: 13-cv-00469-EJL

wife and husband,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

ORDER TO REivlAND CASE TO STATE
COURT

COOK INCORPORATED, an Indiana
corporation; COOK MEDICAL
IN CORPORA TED, an Indiana
Corporation; COOK MEDICAL
TECHNOLOGIES, LCC, an Indiana
LLC, and DOES 1-20,
Defendants.
The Stipulation (Dkt. 16) of the parties having come before this court and it
appearing from the suggestion of the parties that this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction and the parties having stipulated to remand the case to state court,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-entitled action is remanded to the
district court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho, In and For the County
of Bonneville, Case No. CV-13-04868; and the Clerk shall mail a certified copy of this
Order to the Clerk of the aforesaid Idaho state court. No costs or attorney foes are taxed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

ORDER TO REMAND CASE TO STATE COURT - l

EXHIBIT "D"

4:
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&
1000 Riverwalk
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 8340,5-0130

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
CAROL ENGLISH and ERIC ENGLISH,
wife and husband,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
COOK INCORPORATED, an Indiana
corporation; COOK MEDICAL
INCORPORATED, an Indiana Corporation;
COOK MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,
an Indiana LLC; and DOES 1-20,

Case No. 4:13-cv-469-EJL

STIPULATION FOR REMAND TO THE
SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, BONNEVILLE
COUNIY

Defendants.

Counsel for the parties in this matter hereby stipulate that the Plaintiffs' filing of
the Second Amended Complaint in this matter deprives the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho of diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) and that
the filing of such Second Amended Complaint requires that this matter be remanded to
the Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Bonneville County.

Dated this 17TH day of January, 2014.

1 - STIPUL'\TION FOR REMAND TO THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE DISTRICT OF
IDAHO, BONNEVILLE COUNTY

0

4:

-EJL

Document 16

2

01/1 !,

~~~~,,u~ Casperson
~~---~··, Kidwell,

3

&

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Craig Yabui
ELAM&BURKE

Attorneys for Defendants

2 - STIPULATION FOR RE.MAND TO THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE DISTRICT OF
IDAHO, BONNEVILLE COUNTY

61
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I
I
electronically through the
system, which causes the following parties or
counsel to be served by electronic means, as more fully reflected on the Notice of
Electronic Filing.
DOCUMENT SERVED:

STIPULA110N FOR REMAND TO THE
SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF IDAHO, BONNEVILLE COUNTY

ATTORNEYS SERVED:
William Dryden
Craig Yabui
ELAM&BURKE
251 E. Front St., Ste. 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701
Douglas B. King
dking@woodmclaw.com
Brian D. Burbrink
bburbrink@hvoodmclaw.com
WOODEN & MCLAUGHLIN LLP
One Indiana Square, Ste. 1800
211 N. Pennsylvania
Indianapolis, IN 46204

Attorneys for Cook Incorporated, Cook Jllfedical Incorporated,
and Cook Medical Technologies, LLC

DeAnne Casperson

3 - STIPULATION FOR REJ.vIA.1\TD TO THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE DISTRICT OF
IDAHO, BONNEVILLE COUNTY

62

4
Friess,
THOMSEN HOLMAN WHEILER, PLLC
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Telephone (208) 522-1230
Fax (208) 522-1277
wheiler@thwlaw.com
friess@thwlaw.com
Attorneys for Defendant James Taylor, D.O.
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
CAROL ENGLISH and ERJC ENGLISH,
wife and husband,

)
)

Case No. CV-2013-0004868-0C

)

Plaintiffs,

)
)
v.
) DEFENDANT JAMES TAYLOR, D.O.'S
) REPLY MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
COOK INCORPORATED, an Indiana
)
TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
corporation; COOK MEDICAL
)
RECONSIDERATION
INCORPORATED, an Indiana Corporation; )
COOK MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES, LCC,)
an Indiana LLC; JAMES TAYLOR, D.O.; )
EASTERN IDAHO HEALTH SERVICES, )
INC. dba EASTERN IDAHO REGIONAL )
MEDICAL CENTER, an Idaho Corporation;)
and DOES 1-20;
)
)
Defendants.
)

COMES NOW DefendantJames Taylor, D.O., by and through counsel ofrecord, and submits
the following Reply Memorandum in opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion For Reconsideration.

DEFENDANT JAfvfES TAYLOR, D.O.'S REPLY :MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

one

same facts presented

the Motions

for Summary Judgment. The additional fact now raised by Plaintiffs (which could easily have been
raised at the time of the motions for summary judgment 1) is that on April 9, 2014, Judge Lodge
entered an Order in the federal proceedings stating, "The Court hereby clarifies that Plaintiffs'
Second Amended Complaint was effectively filed on December 10, 2013, the date it was filed with
Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion to Amend." See Exhibit ''A" attached to the Second Affidavit of J
Michael Wheiler. The Order was issued by Judge Lodge pursuant to a Rule 60 Motion to Clarify

filed by the Plaintiffs on March 4, 2014. See Exhibit "B" attached to the Second Affidavit ofJ
i\!fichael Wheiler. In as much as Dr. Taylor and EIRMC were not parties to the federal proceedings

and a copy of the motion was not served upon them, Plaintiffs' motion was unopposed. As such,
this is the medical defendants' first opportunity to argue against the validity of Plaintiffs' Rule 60
motion.
Of significant note is the fact that the Plaintiffa' Rule 60 motion was filed after the federal
case was dismissed and the case had been remanded to this Court for further proceedings. According
to the History on PACER, an order dismissing the case was entered on January 21, 2014. See
Exhibit "A" attached to the First Affidavit ofJ. 1\1ichael Wheiler. On that same date, January 21,

2014, Judge Lodge entered an Order To Remand Case To State Court. See Exhibit "C" attached

Plaintiffs knew about the order almost two weeks before filing their response to Dr.
Taylor's motion for summary judgment but failed to raise any arguments regarding the order at that
time. Plaintiffs should now be precluded from raising arguments based on evidence which was
available to the Plaintiffs at the time of their initial response but which they intentionally chose not
to raise for whatever strategic purpose. See, e.g, Campbell v. Kvamme, 155 Idaho 692, 696, 316
P.3d 104 (2013).
2

DEFENDANT JAMES TAYLOR, D.O.'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
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1vfichael Wheiler.

come before

court

it

noted that "the parties
that this Court

subject matter jurisdiction and the parties having stipulated to remand the case to state court,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-entitled action is remanded to the district court of the
Seventh Judicial District of the State ofldaho, In and For the County of Bonneville, Case No. CV13-04868 .... " (Emphasis added.) Indeed, on January 17, 2014, Plaintiffs and Defendant Cook
stipulated that adding Idaho defendants deprived the United States District Court of jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U .S.C. § 144 7( e) requiring that the case be remanded to this Court. See E,-'.xhibit "D"
attached to the Second Affidavit of.! lvfichael Wheiler.
Therefore, prior to the filing of Plaintiffs' unopposed Rule 60 Motion, the parties to the
action and the federal court had already acknowledged that the federal court lacked jurisdiction and
the case had officially been remanded to this Court for further proceedings.
ARGUMENT
1.

The Federal District Court Lacked Jurisdiction to Grant the Motion.

'·Once a district court certifies a remand order to state court, it is divested ofjurisdiction and
can take no further action on the case." Seedman v. United States District Court, 837 F.2d 413,414
(9 1h Cir. 1988). "It is clear that a remand order ends the federal court's jurisdiction." Pelleport
Investors, Inc. v. Budco Quality Theatres, Inc., 741 F.2d 273,279 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing United
States v. Rice, 327 U.S. 742, 747, 66 S. Ct. 835,837, 90 L. Ed. 982 (1946). See also In re Lowe, 102
F.3d 731, 736 (4th Cir. 1996) ("Accordingly, we hold that a federal court loses jurisdiction over a
case as soon as its order to remand the case is entered."); Brierly v. Alusuisse Flexible Packaging,

3
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1999)

' l
that

not

... a remand to state court divests a district court of

any

on

case.

v. Santiago Plaza, 598 F.3d 634, 636 (1st Cir. 1979) ("[o]nce a district court has decided to
remand a case and has so notified the state court, the district judge is without power to take any
further action."); New England Technology Finance, LLC v. Enterprise Resource Procurement. LLC,
2008 WL 2688099, *2 (D. Arizona 2008) ('"[I]t is clear that an order of remand to state court ends
the jurisdiction of the federal court over the case."') (Citing Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal
Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction 3d § 379 at 491.)
Accordingly, since the federal court was without jurisdiction when it entered its April 9, 2014
Order the order is void and has no value or applicability to this Court.
2.

Federal Law Does Not Dictate When the Idaho Statute of Limitations Begins.

Even if Judge Lodge had jurisdiction to "clarify" his prior order, it is beyond dispute that
when a federal court exercises diversity jurisdiction the forum state's substantive law applies and
controls. Erie Railroadv. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938). Statutes
oflimitations are substantive for Erie purposes. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110, 65
S. Ct. 1464, 89 L. Ed. 2079 (1945). Decisions from the Idaho Supreme Court are controlling
authority on questions ofidaho law. Commissioner v. Bosch, 387 U.S. 456,465, 87 S. Ct. 1776, 18
L. Ed. 2d 886 (1967). Thus, for purposes of Plaintiffs' Motion For Reconsideration there is no

question that Griggs v. Nash, 116 Idaho 228,775 P.2d 120 ( 1989) is the substantive law that applies,
controls, and should dictate the outcome of this matter.
Plaintiffs cite J..Iayes v. AT& T Information Systems, Inc., 867 F .2d 1172 (sth Cir. 1989) and

4
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Inc., 461

V.

as

m

the plaintiff alleged violation

was a

case

a collective bargaining agreement and the court applied

29 USC §160(b). The 3th Circuit then simply looked to federal law for guidance on the issue and
cited Rademaker, Longo and Eaton as support for its decision. Those cases will be addressed below.
The Buller case was a breach of contract and fraud case against an insurance carrier which
was originally filed in St. Clair County Illinois. After the plaintiff amended the state court complaint
to seek class certification, the defendant removed the case to federal district court pursuant to the
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAF A). Id. at 771. The CAF A was not retroactive and applied
only to class actions which were commenced on or after the date of enactment. Id. at 772. As such,
the primary issue before the federal district court was whether the class action was commenced at
the time the motion to amend was filed or when the court granted the motion to amend.
In analyzing that issue, the district judge cited a Seventh Circuit case 2 which left open the
question of whether state law or federal law should govern the question of whether a motion for
leave to amend a complaint "commences" an action for purposes of the CAF A. Id. at 774. The
district judge then noted as follows:
The Court concludes that the issue of when this action was commenced as a
class action for purposes of removal under CAF A is governed by state law, not
federal law. As the Schillinger court recognized, "in cases for which state law
provides the rule of decision, federal courts apply state statutes of limitations,
including qualifications on those statutes." 425 F.3d at 334. Cf Pace v.
DiGugliemo, 544 U.S. 498,415, 125 S.CT. 1807, 161 L.Ed.2d 669 (2005)(1ooking
to state law to determine when a pleading has been "properly file" for purposes of a
foderal statute oflimitations); Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 751, 100

Schillinger v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 425 F.3d 330 (7th Cir. 2005).
5
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1978,
659 (l 980)(state
commences for statute of limitation purposes); Herb v.
89
789 (l 945)("Whether any case is
courts is a question to
Illinois

Id at 775. (Emphasis added.)
The federal district judge then added, "In federal actions based on diversitv of citizenship
jurisdiction. federal courts apply state law to decide when a lawsuit was commenced for certain
purposes, such as computing limitations periods." Id. (Emphasis added.) The federal judge noted
that this rule was based on the holding in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817,
82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938) "that federal courts lack constitutional power to fashion broad swathes of
federal common law and that, when a federal court sitting in diversity acts in effect as a state court,
its application of state law should be controlled by authoritative interpretations of that law by the
highest court of that state." Id. Therefore, the federal district court judge applied lllinois law to
determine the issue ( Fischer v. Senior Living Properties, LLC, 771 N.E.2d 505 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).

Id. at 777.
The Buller decision is, therefore, contrary to the argument being pressed upon this Court by
Plaintiffs. In fact, Buller stands for the proposition that Idaho state law should be applied not federal
law. Indeed, the federal district judge in Buller was correct in his analysis. The United States
Supreme Court has held as follows:
Certainly, the fortuitous circumstance ofresidence out of a State of one of the parties
to a litigation ought not to give rise to a discrimination against others equally
concerned but locally resident. The source of substantive rights enforced by a federal
court under diversity jurisdiction, it cannot be said too often, is the law of the States.
Whenever that law is authoritatively declared by a State, whether its voice be the
legislature or its highest court, such law ought to govern in litigation founded on that
law, whether the forum of application is a state of a federal court and whether the
remedies be sought at law or may be had in equity.
6
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65

2079 (1945). The

an

of

law in diversity cases in the federal courts." Id. at 110.

Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 100 S. Ct. 1978, 64 L.Ed.2d 659 (1980) is also
a case on point and directly contrary to the position being argued by Plaintiffs herein. The issue as
stated by the Supreme Court was " ... whether in a diversity action the federal court should follow
state law or, alternatively, Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in determining when an
action is commenced for the purpose of tolling the state statute of limitations." Id. at 741. At the
outset, the Supreme Court noted, " ... we established the rule that 'except in matters governed by the
Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any diversity case is the law
of the State." Id. at 745.
Most importantly, the Supreme Court held that "In construing Erie we noted that 'in essence,
the intent of that decision was to insure that, in all cases where a federal court is exercising
jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the
litigation in the federal court should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine
the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court." Id. (Emphasis added.)

Citing Guaranty Trust, the Court then stated that it had already concluded that a state statute of
limitations should be applied because, "Plainly enough, a statute that would completely bar recovery
in a 1983 suit ifbrought in a State court bears on a State-created right vitally and not merely formally
or negligibly. As to consequences that so intimately affect recovery or non-recovery a federal court
in a diversity case should follow state law." Id.
In this case, we are dealing with an alleged right to recover derived not from the United
7
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OPPOSITION TO

should be applied and Idaho state law
outcome

case-not

Court, in diversity cases, the outcome of litigation

the federal court should be substantially the

same as it would be if tried in a State court. Plaintiffs argue that this Court must follow federal law
rather than state law and by doing so the Court must fashion an outcome completely different from
the outcome mandated by Idaho state law. As noted above, the policies underlying diversity
jurisdiction do not support such a distinction between state and federal plaintiffs and Erie and its
progeny do not permit such an interpretation.
In their initial briefing, Plaintiffs made a similar argument. However, most of the federal
cases cited by Plaintiffs at that time had jurisdiction under federal law. Some of those cases were
simply adding new claims against a prior named defendant. For example, Rademaker was a federal
question case under the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (and it specifically noted "In this state of the
pleadings, process was issued and served upon defendant, before any right of action against it was
barred." The complaint was later amended after the statute had run.) Korvvekwas a federal antitrust

case and it was a motion to intervene not amend the complaint. Sheets was a claim under the Federal
1933 Securities Act. Eaton was a patent claim but there was diversity jurisdiction on the non-patent
claims. Eaton cited Rademaker as its authority. Flood was a 1983 action and it applied North
Carolina law. Mauney was a North Carolina state case that added a claim not a new defendant.

Northwestern was a diversity action but the amendment was to add a new claim not a new party.
Derdiarian was a federal question case under Section l l of the 1933 Securities Act and it was an
amendment to add a claim not a new defendant. Mason was also a federal question case alleging
claims under 18 USC 1962 and RICO. In Re Integrated was a federal question case under the 1933
8
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it was

to use

as

state
was

a

diversity case involving wrongful death with a potential claim under the Federal Employers Liability
Act.

The court simply relied on Federal Rule 5 in rendering its decision.

It did not apply

Pennsylvania state law as it should have. Pennsylvania law is clear that it is the filing of the
complaint, not the filing of a motion to amend that "commences an action.'' See Aivazogulou v.

Drever Furnaces, 613 A.2d 595 (Superior Ct. PA 1992); Schach v. Ford Alotor Co., 210 FRD 522
(MD PA 2002). Had Gloster properly applied Pennsylvania state law, the outcome would have been
different.
Finally, Nett was a 1st Circuit diversity case involving claims of medical malpractice. It
applied Massachusetts state law and specifically certified the question "does the filing of a motion
for leave to amend constitute the commencement of the action for purposes of the statute?" to the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts. That court answered the question yes-the operative date is the
date the motion was filed. The point is, the 1st Circuit deferred to the Massachusetts Supreme Court
to decide the question. The l st Circuit did not just apply federal law as Plaintiffs suggest is mandated
by federal law.
In this case, the Court properly analyzed Idaho State law and applied that law correctly in
determining that Plaintiffs had not timely filed their claim against the medical providers. As such,
Plaintiffs' Motion For Reconsideration should be denied.

3.

Application of the Statute of Limitations was Mandatory.

Plaintiffs assert that this Court should ignore the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Griggs
and that federal "procedural regulations" should be applied so as to dispose of this case on its merits.
9
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mour

purposes are

bythe

statute
judicial decree to a period in excess of the time established by the Idaho legislature. Idaho Code §5201 unambiguously states that civil actions in this state "can only be commenced within the periods
prescribed in this chapter. ... " (Emphasis added.)
Plaintiffs do not dispute that Idaho Code §5-219 is the controlling statute oflimitation. That
section states that an action to recover damages for professional malpractice must be filed within two
(2) years of the cause of action accruing and that the cause of action "shall be deemed to have
accrued as of the time of the occurrence, act or omission complained ot: and the limitation period
shall not be extended by reason of any continuing consequences or damages resulting therefrom or
any continuing professional or commercial relationship between the injured party and the alleged
wrongdoer.. .. " Therefore, applying the language of both statutes, an action for medical malpractice
can only be commenced within two (2) years of the act or omission complained of Billings v.
Sisters of lvfercy, 86 Idaho 485, 488-89, 389 P.2d 224 (1964)3. The language of the statutes is

mandatory. It is not merely procedural. It is not subject to discretionary application.
In this case, there is no dispute that the act or omission complained of occurred on September
17, 2011. There is also no dispute that (1) Plaintiffs' Pre litigation Screening Panel Application dated
September 12, 2013 was stamped as received by the Idaho State Board of Medicine on September
16, 2013; (2) that the Prelitigation Screening Panel filed its Opinion on November 18, 2013; (3)that

3

Additionally, as the dissent notes, "Meritorious claims may, it is true, be barred by
commencing the running of the statute from the time of the negligent act when discovery is later
made. Statutes of limitations in general, however, in their operation cut off both meritorious and
unmeritorious claims." Id. at 501.
10
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statute

on
on

13; or

that

1

attempt to avoid the statute of limitations acting to bar their claims against the
medical providers in this case by asserting that applying the statute of limitations is merely
procedural and not mandatory. Based upon the plain wording of the statutes and the case law, the
Court should decline Plaintiffs' invitation to reconsider its decision.
4.

Proper Notice Was Not Given.

With regard to the notice argument, Plaintiffs only regurgitate the same arguments they
previously made and suggest that the Court simply change its mind. Dr. Taylor refers the Court to
his Reply Memorandum and that of defendant EIRMC in addressing this issue. The Court was right
the first time and should not change its decision.
CONCLUSION

There is no dispute that the statute oflimitations in this case expired on December 19, 2013.
There is no dispute that Plaintiffs' original and first amended complaints did not name Dr. Taylor
nor did those pleadings state a claim for medical negligence. There is no dispute that on December
10, 2013, Plaintiffs filed in federal court a motion to amend their complaint a third time with a
proposed second amended complaint attached to the motion. There is no dispute that Plaintiffs filed
a second amended complaint in federal court on January 16, 2014-nearly one month after the statute
expired. There is no dispute that Dr. Taylor was not served with a copy of the motion to amend or
the proposed second amended complaint prior to December 19, 2013. There is no dispute that Dr.
Taylor was first served with the Second Amended Complaint on March 21, 2014.
Based upon the facts of this case, the plain language of the Idaho statutes of limitation, and
11
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Idaho Supreme Court's decisions in Terra-West and Griggs,
would be
Code

19 and the Erie doctrine. Therefore, Dr.

action against Dr. Taylor was
to

respectfully requests

Idaho
Court deny

Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider.
Dated this

12

11tffi_ay of August, 2014.
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Attorney for Defendant Eastern Idaho Health Services, Inc.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

CAROL ENGLISH and ERIC ENGLISH,)
wife and husband
)
) Case No.: CV-2013-4868
Plaintiffs,
)
)
)

VS.

COOK INCORPORATED, an Indiana
corporation: COOK MEDICAL
INCORPORATED, an Indiana Corporation;
COOK MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,
an Indiana LLC; JAMES TAYLOR, D.O.;
EASTERN IDAHO HEALTH SERVICES,
INC. dba EASTERN IDAHO REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER, an Idaho corporation;
and DOES 1-20,

AFFIDAVIT OF MARVIN M. SMITH
) OPPOSING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
) RECONSIDERATION
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)

Defendants.
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Bonneville

)
:ss.
)

MARVIN M. SMITH, after being first duly sworn under oath, deposes and states as
follows:
1.

I am one of the attorneys of record in this matter for Eastern Idaho Health

Services, Inc. d/b/a Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center and make the following statements
based upon my own personal knowledge.
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2.

Attached

as Exhibit

Judge

is a tme and correct copy of an April 9, 2014

Idaho federal district court case no.
as

is

true

correct

13-cv-00469-EJL.
a

4,

14 Rule

60 Motion to Clarify Docket Entry Order filed in Idaho federal district court case no. 4: 13-cv00469-EJL.
4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit '"C" is a true and correct copy of a January 17. 2014

Stipulation for Remand to the Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Bonneville County
filed in Idaho federal district comi case no. 4:13-cv-00469-EJL.
5.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "D" is a true and correct copy of a January 21, 2014

Order to Remand Case to State Court filed in Idaho federal district court case no. 4: 13-cv-00469EJL.
DATED this

2f-t"'day of August, 2014.
Marvin M. Smith

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

of August, 2014.
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EXHIBIT A

CAROL ENGLISH and ERJC ENGLISH.
wife and husband,

Case

l 3-cv-00469-EJL

ORDER

Plaintiffs,
VS.

COOK INCORPORATED. an Indiana
c0111oration; COOK MEDICAL
INCORPORATED. an Indiana
Corporation: COOK MEDICAL
TECHNOLOGIES. LCC, an Indiana
LLC, and DOES 1-20.
Defendants.

Before the Court is Plaintiffs' Unopposed Iviotion to Clarify Docket Entry
Order 13 (Dkt. 19). Docket Entry Order 13 granted Plaintiffs· Unopposed lvlotion
for leave to File Second Amended Complaint. Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6)

the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Cami hereby GRANTS Plaintiffs' Motion to
Clarify (Dkt. 19) and clarifies its Docket Entry Order 13. Specifically, Docket
Entry Order 13 did not address the effective commencement of the claims asserted
in the Second Amended Complaint filed with Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion to
Amend. The Court hereby clarifies that Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint
was effectivelv filed on December 10, 2013.. the date it was filed with Plaintiffs'
~

.

Unopposed Motion to Amend (Dkt. 10).

ORDER TO REMA.ND CASE TO STATE COURT

l

ORDER TO REMAND

TO STATE COURT - 2

EXHIBIT B

Filed

e

DeAnne Casperson

&
Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0130

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
CAROL ENGLISH and ERIC ENGLISH,
wife and husband,

RULE 60 MOTION TO CLARIFY
DOCKET ENTRY ORDER

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Case No. 4:13-cv-469-EJL
COOK INCORPORATED, an Indiana
corporation; COOK MEDICAL
INCORPORATED, an Indiana Corporation;
COOK MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,
an Indiana LLC; JAMES TAYLOR, D.O.;
E.A.STER.c~ IDAHO HEALTH SERVICES,
INC. dba EASTERN IDAHO REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER, an Idaho Corporation;
and DOES 1-20,

Judge Edward J. Lodge

Defendants.

Plaintiffs hereby move the Court for an order clarifying that its Docket Entry
Order of January 16, 2014 1 relates back to the date on which Plaintiffs filed their Motion
for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint/ accompanied by a copy of the Second
~A.mended Complaint itself. This will have the effect of clarifying that the Complaint was
filed on December 10, 2013, instead of some other date. This clarification is consistent

1
2

Doc. 13.
Doc. 10, filed Dec.

10, 2013.

JL

2

existing law as is explained in the accompanying Memorandum

Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes courts to

their

own orders at anytime prior to the docketing of an appeal. No such appeal has been
docketed in this case, and Plaintiffs submit that the Court has continuing jurisdiction to
make the requested clarification.
Dated this

4th

day of March,

2014.

HOLDEN, ICTDvVELL, HAHK & CRA.PO

/s/ DeAnne Casperson
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

4

JL

CERTIFICATE
I
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a true

correct

of

the foregoing RULE 60 MOTION TO CLARIFY DOCKET ENTRY ORDER to be
filed via ECF, which sent notice of the same to the follmving:
William Dryden
,vgd@1elamburke.eom
Craig Yabui
c:-y@elamburke.eom
ELAM&BURKE
251 E. Front St., Ste. 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701
Douglas B. King
dking@woodmclaw .corn
Brian D. Burbrink
bburbrink(g)woodmclav,·.corn
WOODEN & MCLAUGHLIN LLP
One Indiana Square, Ste. 1800
211 N. Pennsylvania
Indianapolis, IN 46204

Attorneys.for Defendants Cook. Incorporated. Cook. Medical Incorporated, and Cook
Medical Technologies, LLC
/s/ Deiume Casperson
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1

Rivenvalk
Ste. 200
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0130
1000

~4ttorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRJCT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
CAROL ENGLISH and ERJC ENGLISH,
wife and husband,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
COOK INCORPORATED, an Indiana
corporation; COOK MEDICAL
INCORPOR.A..TED, an Indiana Corporation;
COOK MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,
an Indiana LLC; and DOES 1-20,

Case No. 4:13-cv-469-EJL

II

/STIPULATION FOR REMAND TO THE
I SEVE1\1TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
:THE STATE OF IDAHO, BONNEVILLE
I
COUNTY

Defendants.

Counsel for the parties in this matter hereby stipulate that the Plaintiffs' filing of
the Second A.mended Complaint in this matter deprives the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho of diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) and that
the filing of such Second Amended Complaint requires that this matter be remanded to
the Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Bonneville County.

Dated this 17TH day of January, 2014.

STIPULATION FOR RElvLA..ND TO THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE DISTRICT OF
IDAH C•. BOJ\TNEVILLE COlJl\T'fl!

1-

7

DeAnne Casperson
Holden. Kidwell.

& Crapo, P

Craig Yabui
ELA..M &BURKE

A.ttomeys for Defendants

2 - STIPULATION FOR REMi\ND TO THE SEVEl"<"TH JUDICL!\.L DISTRICT FOR THE DISTRICT OF
IDAHO, BONNEVILLE COUNTY

J
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that on
CM/ECF

SERVICE
I
foregoing
which causes the follO\<ving parties or
as more fully reflected on the Notice of

/

DOCUMENT SERVED:
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CAROL ENGLISH and EPJC ENGLISH,

wife and husband,
Plaintiffs,

vs.

Case No, 4:13-cv-00469-EJL
ORDER TO R.EMA.JID CASE TO
COURT

COOK IN CORPORATED, an Indiana
corporation; COOK MEDICAL
INCORPORATED, an Indiana
Corporation; COOK MEDICAL
TECHNOLOGIES, LCC, an Indiana
LLC, and DOES 1-20,
Defendants.

The Stipulation (Dkt. 16) of the panies having come before this court anc it
appearing from the suggestion of the parties that this Colli""l lacks subject matter
jurisdiction and the parties having stipulated to remand the case to state court,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-entitled action is remanded to the
district court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho, In and For the County
of Bonneville, Case No. CV-13-04868; and the Clerk shall mail a certified copy

this

Order to the Clerk of the aforesaid Idaho state court. No costs or attorney fees are taxed
pursuant to 2S

.S.

§ }Li47(c).

January 21, 2014

/~~
~~.
/ ~ \ ()/! ~ I
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Unned States District Judge

ORDER

CASE TO STATE COURT - l

Certified to be a true and correct
copt_9f ori9ina! filed in my offlce.
t:11zabetr1 A. Smith, Clerk
U~States~ffistrict of Idaho .

Bl~~~
Deputy

/ / Z..~ /IC(
Daied .
'

2236
6978
10 Jennie Lee Drive
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Telephone: (208) 529-3005
Facsimile: (208) 529-3065
Attorneys for Defendant Eastern Idaho Health Services, Inc.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

CAROL ENGLISH and ERIC ENGLISH,)
)
wife and husband
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
vs.
)
)
COOK IN CORPORATED, an Indiana
)
corporation; COOK MEDICAL
IN CORPORA TED, an Indiana Corporation; )
COOK MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, )
)
an Indiana LLC; JAMES TAYLOR, D.O.;
)
EASTERN IDAHO HEALTH SERVICES,
)
INC. dba EASTERN IDAHO REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER, an Idaho corporation; )
and DOES 1-20,
)
)
Defendants.

Case No.: CV-2013-4868

EASTERN IDAHO HEALTH SERVICES,
INC. dba EASTERN IDAHO REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER'S MEMORANDUM
OPPOSING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

COMES NOW Defendant Eastern Idaho Health Services, Inc. dba Eastern Idaho
Regional Medical Center ("EIRMC"), by and through counsel, and submits its Memorandum
Opposing Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On their motion for reconsideration Plaintiffs rely upon the same facts presented during
EIRMC's and Dr. Taylor's Motions for Summary Jud,6rn1ent, with one exception. Plaintiffs now
rely on an April 9, 2014 Order entered by Judge Lodge in the federal proceedings. Exhibit A,
EIRMC'S MEMORANDUM OPPOSING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
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attached to the Affidavit of Marvin M. Smith Opposing Plaintiff._v · Motion for Reconsideration
filed

Order was

by Judge

Motion to Clarify Docket Entry Order filed by Plaintiffs on March

pursuant to a Rule 60
2014 (which was after

EIRMC had been served with process for the present state court action on February 25, 2014).

Id. at Exhibit B. Because EIRMC and Dr. Taylor were not parties to the federal proceedings and
because copies of Plaintiffs' Motion to Clarify were never served upon them Plaintiffs' motion
was unopposed. As a result, this is EIRMC's and Dr. Taylor's first opportunity to argue against
the validity of Plaintiffs' Rule 60 motion and the April 9, 2014 Order.
Most importantly, Plaintiffs' Rule 60 Motion was not filed until after the federal action
was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and remanded to this Court for further proceedings. On
January 17, 2014, Plaintiffs and Cook Defendants stipulated that adding EIRMC and Dr. Taylor
to the federal action deprived the federal court of jurisdiction over the matter and that it should
be remanded to this Comi. Id. at Exhibit C. Pursuant to Plaintiffs and Cook Defendants
stipulation, the federal court entered an Order on January 21, 2014, wherein it stated:
... it appearing from the suggestion of the parties that this Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction and the parties having stipulated to remand the case to state
court,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-entitled action is remanded to the
district court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State ofldaho, In and For the
County of Bonneville, Case No. CV-13-04868 ...

Id. at Exhibit D.
Thus, before Plaintiffs even filed their Rule 60 Motion, the Plaintiffs, Cook Defendants,
and the federal court had already acknowledged that the federal court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction and the case had been remanded to this Comi for further proceedings.
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ANALYSIS
FEDERAL COURT LACKED JURISDICTION
GRANT PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION OR ENTER THE APRIL 9, 2014 ORDER BECAUSE THE MATTER
HAD BEEN REMANDED TO STATE COURT.
"Once a district court certifies a remand order to state court it is divested of jurisdiction
and can take no further action on the case.'' Seedman v. United States District Court, 837 F.2d
413, 414 (9th Cir. 1988). "It is clear that a remand order ends the federal court's jurisdiction."
Pelleport Investors, Inc. v. Budco Quality Theatres, Inc., 741 F.2d 273,279 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1984)
(citing United States v. Rice, 327 U.S. 742, 747, 66 S. Ct. 835,837, 90 L. Ed. 982 (1946). See
also In re Lowe, 102 F.3d 731, 736 (4th Cir. 1996) ("Accordingly, we hold that a federal court
loses jurisdiction over a case as soon as its order to remand the case is entered."); Brier(v v.
Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc., 184 F.3d 527, 531 (6th Cir. 1999) (" ... a remand to state
court divests a district court of jurisdiction such it may not take any further action on the case."):
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Santiago Plaza, 598 F.3d 634, 636 (1st Cir. 1979) ("[ o]nee a
district court has decided to remand a case and has so notified the state court, the district judge is
without power to take any further action."); New England Technology Finance, LLC v.
Ente,prise Resource Procurement, LLC, 2008 WL 2688099, *2 (D. Arizona 2008) ('" [I]t is clear
that an order of remand to state court ends the jurisdiction of the federal court over the case.'")
(Citing Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction 3d § 379 at
491.)
Accordingly, since the federal court was without jurisdiction when Plaintiffs filed their
Rule 60 Motion and when it entered its April 9, 2014 Order the judgment is void and has no
value or applicability to this Court.
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IL

THE APRIL 9, 2014 ORDER IS NOT NEW EVIDENCE TO CONSIDER ON
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.
to

new

a Rule 1

for reconsideration, their motion is in part based upon this Comi now considering an April 9,
2014 Order that was not properly before the Court on the previous motions for summary
judgment. Obviously, this Order was known to Plaintiffs almost two weeks before their response
to DL Taylor's Motion for Summary Judgment was due, however, Plaintiffs failed to submit the
same. It is too late to now submit an order that could have, and should have been submitted to
the Comi prior to the motions for summary judgment that were heard on May 5, 2014. See

Campbell v. Kvamme, 155 Idaho 692,696,316 P.3d 104, 108 (2013) (reciting district court's
rationale for denying Campbells' Motion for Reconsideration).
Additionally, this is analogous to the situation of newly discovered evidence under Rule
60(b)(2) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The Idaho Supreme Court and I.R.C.P. 60(b)(2)
agree that newly discovered evidence is evidence that is in existence at the time of trial but not
discoverable with due diligence. See LR.C.P. 60(b )(2); Savage Lateral Ditch Water Users

Association v. Pulley, 125 Idaho 237,245, 869 P.2d 554, 562 (1993). As stated above, the
information Plaintiff now seeks to introduce existed and was available prior to the motions for
summary judgment, however, Plaintiff failed to submit or raise any arguments based upon the
order to this Court. Accordingly, the April 9, 2014 is not new evidence and should not be
considered by this Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration.

Ill.

IDAHO LAW CONTROLS WHEN AN ACTION IS COMMENCED FOR
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PURPOSES.

It is beyond dispute that when a federal comi exercises diversity jurisdiction the forum
state·s substantive law applies and controls. Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct.

El RM C'S MEMORANDUM OPPOSING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
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817,

1188 (1938). Statutes oflimitations are substantive for Erie purposes. Guaranty

11
is controlling authority on questions

1464,

1945).

Supreme

Idaho law. Commissioner r. Bosch, 3

456,

465, 87 S. Ct. 1776, 18 L. Ed. 2d 886 (1967). Thus. for purposes of Plaintiffs' Motion for
Reconsideration there is no question that Griggs v. Nash, 1] 6 Idaho 228, 775 P.2d 120 (1989) is
the substantive law that applies, controls, and should dictate the outcome of this matter.
Plaintiffs' assertion that federal law controls when an action is commenced in a federal
diversity case is without merit and contrary to established law. Any reliance Plaintiffs place
upon Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 85 S. Ct. 1136, 14 L. Ed. 2d 8 (1965) is misplaced and
outdated because Hanna was later qualified by Walk.er v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 741,
100 S. Ct. 1978, 1980, 64 L. Ed. 2d 659, 662 (1980) and many other subsequent federal
decisions as cited below.
In Walk.er, the United States Supreme Court squarely confronted the issue of "whether in
a diversity action the federal court should follow state law or, alternatively, Rule 3 of the Federal
rules of Civil Procedure in detennining when an action is commenced for the purpose of tolling
the state statute oflimitations." Walk.er v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 741, 100 S. Ct.
1978, 1980, 64 L. Ed. 2d 659, 662 (1980). In said case the Supreme Comi noted that it had
already established in earlier precedent that"' [except] in matters governed by the Federal

Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any [diversity] case is the law
of the State."' Id. at 745 (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court went on in Walker to state:
In construing Erie we noted that "[in] essence, the intent of that decision was to
insure that, in all cases where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely
because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the
litigation in the federal court should be substantially the same, so far as legal
EIRMC'S MEMORANDUM OPPOSING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
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rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State
court (citation omitted). We concluded that the state statute oflimitations
should
applied. 'Plainly enough, a statute that would completely bar
in a suit if brought in a State court
on a State-created
vitally and not
merely formally or negligibly. As to consequences that so intimately affect
recovery or non-recovery a federal court in a diversity case should follow State
law.'

Id. at 745 (emphasis added).
Finally, the Walker Court held: "In our view, in diversity actions Rule 3 governs the date
from which various timing requirements of the Federal Rules begin to run, but does not affect
state statutes oflimitations.'' Id. at 751.
The present matter involves an alleged right to recover derived from the State of Idaho
not the United States. Accordingly, the Erie doctrine should be applied and Idaho state law
should determine the outcome of the case, not federal law. As set forth above, in diversity cases
the outcome of the litigation in federal court should be substantially the same as it would be if
tried in a State court. Plaintiffs in this matter are arguing that this Court should follow federal
law instead of Idaho state law and by doing so come to a result that would be completely
different and contrary to the outcome mandated by Idaho state law. The policies for diversity
jurisdiction do not support such a distinction between state and federal plaintiffs and Erie and the
cases that follow do not pennit such an interpretation. Accordingly, Idaho state law, specifically
Griggs, is detenninative of the outcome in this matter.

A host of federal law and secondary material is in agreement. The Cami of Appeals for
the Second Circuit has held:
As all parties acknowledge, it is well established that in diversity cases state
law governs not only the limitations period but also the commencement of the
limitations period. See Ragan 1'. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S.
530, 533, 69 S. Ct. 1233, 93 L. Ed. 1520 (1949); see also Guar. Trust Co. 1'. York,
326 U.S. 99, 109-10, 65 S. Ct. 1464, 89 L. Ed. 2079 (1945). The distiict comi
appears to have followed the rule for § 1983 actions, in which a state limitations
ElRMC'S MEMORANDUM OPPOSING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
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is bon-owed but federal law governs when that state limitations period
"'"'"·""' to run. (internal citations omitted). It is appropriate to use federal rules to
when the limitations period begins to run
a
under
§
because the cause of action is created
federal law. When federal
jurisdiction is based on diversity, as it is in this case, however, state
substantive law must govern. See Guar. Trust, 326 U.S. at 109-110; Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79-80, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938). A state's
rules providing for the start and length of the statute of limitations is
substantive law. See e.g., Klehr v. A.O. Smith C01p., 87 F.3d 231,235 (8 111 Cir.),
a.ff"d, 521 U.S. 179, 117 S. Ct. 1984, 138 L. Ed. 2d 373 (1997); Nev. Power Co. v.
Monsanto Co., 955 F.2d 1304, 1306 (9th Cir. 1992).
Cantor Fitzgerald v. Lutnick, 313 F .3d 704, 709-10 (2002) (emphasis added).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the federal civil rule governing
commencement of an action (Fed. R. Civ. P. 3) "does not commence a suit based on state law
for purposes of the statute of limitations . .. [but] does commence a suit based on federal law
that has a statute oflimitations bon-owed from federal law.'' Sain v. City c~f Bend, 309 F.3d 1134,
1138 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted). See also Tornabene v. Marcial, 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14198, *3 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("Marcial con-ectly asserts that, for statute oflimitations
purposes, the time at which a diversity action is commenced depends on the laws of the
state whose substantive law governs the controversy." (citations omitted) (emphasis added));
Durrett v. Leading Edge Prods., 965 F. Supp. 280,286 (D. Conn. 1997) ("As this is a diversity

action arising under Connecticut law, Connecticut state law governs the manner in which
the action is to be considered commenced for purposes of the state statute of limitations.''
(citation omitted) (emphasis added); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Pozvvision C01p., 390 F. Supp. 2d 269,
272 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) ("In this diversity case, it is the law of the State of New York that
governs the time in which the action must be commenced as well as any applicable toll.''
(citation omitted) (emphasis added)).

EIRMC'S MEMORANDUM OPPOSING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
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and Miller's authoritative treatise on federal procedure concisely states the

In federal aetions based on diversity of citizenship jmisdiction, federal courts
apply state law to decide when a lawsuit was commenced for certain purposes,
such as computing limitations periods.
4 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § l 052 (3d ed. 1998
& Supp. 2006).
Interestingly, the Buller Trucking Co. v. Owner Operator Indep. Driver Risk Retention
Group, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 768 (S.D. Ill. 2006) cited to by Plaintiffs in their motion for

reconsideration actually stands contrary to the argument they are presenting to this Court and in
accord with the foregoing case law. The primary issue in said case was whether the class action
was commenced at the time the motion to amend was filed or when the court granted the motion
to amend. The federal district court concluded:
The Court concludes that the issue of when this action was commenced as a
class action for purposes of removal under CAF A is governed by state law, not
federal law. As the Schillinger court recognized, "in cases for which state law
provides the rule of decision, federal courts apply state statutes of limitation,
including qualifications on those statutes.'' 425 F.3d at 334. Cf. Pace v.
DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408,415, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 161 L. Ed. 2d 669 (2005)
(looking to state law to determine when a pleading has been '·properly filed" for
purposes of a federal statute of limitations); Walker 1'. Armco Steel Co,p., 446
U.S. 740, 751, 100 S. Ct. 1978, 64 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1980) (state law determines
when an action commences for statute of limitations purposes) ...
Id. at 775. (Emphasis added).

Thus, under the facts of this case the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Griggs v. Nash,
116 Idaho 228, 775 P.2d 120 (1989) is controlling and detennines when the action in this matter
was "commenced" against EIRMC and Dr. Taylor for statute of limitations purposes. As already
detennined in this Court's Opinion and Order Granting Medical Defendants' Motions for
Summary Judgment, Idaho law dictates that Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File a Second
EIRMC'S MEMORANDUM OPPOSING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
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not commence

EIRMC

not commence the

Plaintiffs
statute

expired. Accordingly Plaintiffs' claims against EIRMC and Dr. Taylor are barred

the statute

limitations. Therefore, Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration should be denied.

IV.

AS SET FORTH ABOVE, IDAHO STATE LAW CONTROLS THE OUTCOME
OF THIS MATTER AND THE CASE LAW CITED IN PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF
HAS NO APPLICABILITY TO THE CASE AT HAND.
Plaintiffs attempted to make a similar aq:,rument (that federal law applied) in their initial

briefing opposing summary judgment. However, as set forth above, there is no question that
Idaho state law, specifically the Idaho Supreme Court decision of Griggs v. Nash, 116 Idaho 228,
775 P.2d 120 (1989) determines the outcome of this case and as such Plaintiffs claims against
EIRMC and Dr. Taylor are barred by the statute of limitations. Since it is state law which
controls the issue before the Court, the decisions cited by Plaintiffs that were rendered in the
context of federal questions cases and utilized federal law can be distinguished on that basis
alone. See Mayes v. AT&T I11formation Systems, Inc., 867 F .2d 1172 (8th Cir. 1989) (action
brought pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 160 (b)); Rademaker v. Flynn Export Co., 17 F.2d 15 (5th Cir.
1927) (federal question under Merchant Marine Act of 1920) (also in that case process was
actually issued and served upon the defendant before any right of action against it was barred);
Moore v. Indiana, 999 F.2d 1125, 1131

(i11 Cir.

1993) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 action).

Any federal diversity cases follow state law for statute of limitations, including when an
action was commenced for statute of limitations purposes pursuant to Walker and its progeny
cited above. Accordingly, any federal cases cited by Plaintiffs that are based upon federal law or
federal diversity cases that look upon state law other than Idaho are distinguishable and have no
precedential value because pursuant to controlling Idaho case law precedent ( Griggs), applicable

EIRMC'S MEMORANDUM OPPOSING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
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and applicable Idaho Rules
was not

Procedure, Plaintiffs·

EIRMC

filing

not

occur until at least twenty-eight (28) days after the statute oflimitations had run. This Court was
conect in granting EIRMC's and Dr. Taylor's Motion for Summary Judgment and therefore
Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration should be denied.

V.

APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN THIS CASE WAS
MANDATORY AND PURSUANT TO IDAHO LAW.
Plaintiffs essentially argue that this Court should have ignored the Idaho Supreme Court's

decision in Griggs v. Nash, l 16 Idaho 228, 775 P.2d 120 (1989) and the application of the statute
oflimitations in this case. Such a position is nonsensical. Important purposes are served by
statutes of limitation. "The policy behind statues of limitations is protection of defendants
against stale claims, and protection of the courts against needless expenditure of resources."

Higginson v. Waddworth, 128 Idaho 439,442,915 P.2d 1, 4 (1996) (quoting Johnson v. Pischke,
108 Idaho 397,402, 700 P.2d 19, 25 (1985)). "Statutes of limitation are designed to promote
stability and avoid uncertainty with regards to future litigation." Id.
If Plaintiffs arguments were accepted in this case the statute of limitations would

effectively be extended by judicial decree to a period in excess of the time established by the
Idaho legislature by virtue ofl.C. § 5-219(4) and LC.§ 6-1005. Not only would this prevent
EIRMC and Dr. Taylor from receiving prompt notice of the claim as intended by the statute but
it would prevent the finality and stability which the statute oflimitations was designed by our
legislature to achieve.
In addition, contrary to Plaintiffs allegations they had several options to avoid having their
lawsuit end up in federal court in the first place. It has been clear in Idaho since 1988 that "'a
party allegedly harmed by medical malpractice could commence a civil lawsuit before filing a
EIRMC'S MEMORANDUM OPPOSING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
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a prelitigation

--"'"'"' panel. Idaho Code §
lS

proceedings.

Moss

1\

V.

138 Idaho

1001 does not mandate the dismissal
commencement
66

(citing

Bjornson, 115 ldaho 165, 765 P.2d 676 (1988)).

Pursuant to Idaho law, Plaintiffs could have filed the present suit against the Cook
Defendants, Dr. Taylor, and EIRMC at the same time and then had several options. One option
was to serve process upon all parties and then enter into a Stipulation to Stay the litigation with
respect to EIRMC and Dr. Taylor until the prelitigation proceedings had concluded while
proceeding with the litigation against the Cook Defendants. Another option was simply to file
the action against all Defendants and then wait to serve the parties until the prelitigation
proceedings with EIRMC and Dr. Taylor had concluded. Plaintiffs could have also filed suit
against all Defendants, serve the Cook Defendants and then wait to serve EIRMC and Dr. Taylor
until the conclusion of the prelitigation proceedings. Any one of these actions on the part of
Plaintiffs would have avoided the Cook Defendants removing the action to federal court. Any
one of these actions would have avoided Plaintiffs having to seek leave of the court to amend
their complaint to add Dr. Taylor and EIRMC as defendants. In addition, Plaintiffs could have
filed a separate action against EIRMC and Dr. Taylor at any time and then moved to consolidate
the cases. Finally, Plaintiffs could have moved to amend their complaint much earlier than they
did to avoid any statute of limitations problems, however, they failed to do so.
For Plaintiffs to consistently ignore Idaho law (resulting in dismissal of their action) and
now demand that this Court disregard Idaho Supreme Court case law precedent and the
applicable statute oflimitations is repugnant. Statutes oflimitations are couched in mandatory
language and are not subject to discretionary application. Deciding a case based upon the statute

EI RM C'S MEMORANDUM OPPOSING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
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oflimitations is an adjudication on the me1its. Plaintiffs had ample time (the time dictated by
§

generous period of time

which the statute was tolled by

the prelitigation screening panel process) in which to commence their claim against EIRMC and
Dr. Taylor. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs failed to commence an action against EIRMC and Dr. Taylor
as required by I.R.C.P. 3(a) and Griggs until after the expiration of the statute of limitations.
Therefore, pursuant to Idaho Supreme Court precedent and applicable Idaho statutes and Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure EIRMC would respectfully request that this Court uphold its pending
Opinion and Order Granting Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and deny Plaintiffs'
motion for reconsideration.

VI.

EIRMC HAD NO NOTICE OF A LAWSUIT AGAINST IT BY PLAINTIFFS
UNTIL AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS.
Plaintiffs' notice argument is simply a rehashing of the same argument that they

previously made to the Court on EIRMC's and Dr. Taylor's Motions for Summary Judgment and
is a request that the Court change its mind. EIRMC incorporates by reference as if fully set forth
herein its arguments regarding notice and those of Dr. Taylor contained in the Memorandums in
Support of Summary Judgment and Replies in Support of Summary Judgment filed previously
with the Court by each pmiy.
Plaintiffs attempt to equate the filing of a prelitigation screening panel request with actual
notice that a lawsuit has been filed against EIRMC is without merit. Numerous prelitigation
screening panel requests are filed against EIRMC and many (if not the vast majority) of such
filings never result in the actual filing of a lawsuit against it. Thus, the filing of a prelitigation
screening panel request does not equate to the filing of a lawsuit against a party. See Ketterling
,'. Burger King Corp .. 152 Idaho 555,558.272 P.3d 527, 530 (2012) (''notice of an injury within
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period is not

same as notice of the filing of

within the limitations

1

Accordingly, there is no dispute that EIRMC had no notice

a lawsuit being filed

against it until after the applicable statute of limitations had run. The situation present in this
case places EIRMC exactly in the same position as the third-party defendant in Griggs and
therefore requires dismissal of EIRMC from this action. Consequently, EIRMC would
respectfully request that this Court uphold its grant of summary judgment in this matter and deny
Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration.

CONCLUSION
The statute of limitations in this case expired on December 19, 2013. Plaintiffs' original
and first amended complaints did not name EIRMC as a defendant and did not state a claim for
medical negligence. Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint in
federal court on December 10, 2013. EIRMC was not served with a copy of Plaintiffs' motion
for leave to file a second amended complaint or the proposed second amended complaint.
Plaintiffs' second amended complaint was not filed in federal court until January 16, 2014;
twenty-eight (28) days after the statute of limitations against EIRMC expired. EIRMC was not
served with the Second Amended Complaint until February 25, 2014.
Based upon the foregoing undisputed facts in this case, the Idaho Supreme Court cases of

Griggs and Terra-West mandate that the action against EIRMC be dismissed. Therefore,
EIRMC respectfully requests that this Court uphold its Opinion and Order Granting Defendants'
Motions for Summary Judgment and deny Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration.
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REPLY MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

COME NOW Plaintiffs Carol English and Eric English ("Plaintiffs"), and submit
Memorandum

Support of Motion for Reconsideration.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In their Memoranda in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration,
Defendants James Taylor ("Taylor") and Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center
("EIRMC") (collectively hereinafter "Medical Defendants"), repeatedly state that, where
a case is before the federal court based upon diversity jurisdiction and there is a
question regarding the statute of limitations, state substantive law applies. Plaintiffs do
not disagree that the statute of limitations itself is a substantive law, and that it must be
applied in cases before the federal court based upon diversity jurisdiction. However,
Medical Defendants miss the point of Plaintiffs' argument. Plaintiffs do not argue, as
Medical Defendants suggest, that Idaho's statute of limitations on medical malpractice
actions be ignored or disregarded. Rather, Plaintiffs argue that the manner in which a
case "commences" is a procedural issue, and, in considering which procedure
applies to determine when an action "commences," the court must apply federal

procedural law, as dictated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the federal Rules
Enabling Act, and federal case law interpreting such rules. "Federal Courts must ignore
state rules of procedure because it is Congress that has primary authority over the
procedures employed in federal court, and this power cannot be trenched upon by the
states." Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 7 F.3d 254, 273 (9th Cir. 2013)(Kozinski, J.
concurring opinion)(citing Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817,
82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938)). The distinction between the statute oflimitations itself, versus
the procedure by which an action commences, is a critical distinction that cannot be
ignored. Federal statutort; and case law, as well as Idaho law, require that this Court
2
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Rules of Civil Procedure and federal case law interpretation
to

when Plaintiffs "commenced"

suit

Defendants because the case was before the federal court when the motion to amend
was filed. The Idaho Supreme Court acknowledged in Terra-West that the meaning of
"commencing proceedings" is not substantive - it is procedural. Terra-West, Inc. v.

Idaho Mutual Trust, LLC, 150 Idaho 393,398, 247 P.3d 620, 625 (2011). Consequently,
the federal procedure rule applies and the action against Medical Defendants must be
deemed to have commenced on December 10, 2013.

II.

ARGUMENT

A. The Rule 60 Motion and Order is Inconsequential to the Outcome of
this Motion.
Medical Defendants contend that Judge Lodge's April 9, 2014, Order on Plaintiffs'
Rule 60 Motion to Clarify Docket Entry Order is "void" and has "no value or
applicability to this Court" because this matter had been remanded to state court at the
time the Order was entered. See EIRMC Opp. Memo. p. 3; Taylor Opp. Memo., p. 4.
None of the cases cited by Medical Defendants on this issue apply to a situation where,
upon a Rule 60 motion, the federal court clarified an order that was entered prior to
remand to state court. While there appear to be no statutes or rules addressing limited
jurisdiction by the federal court after remand, the Idaho Rules of Appellate Procedure
provide some guidance in a somewhat analogous situation, where a case has been
appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court, but the District Court retains jurisdiction over
limited matters.

One of the limited matters over which the District Court retains

jurisdiction and may make rulings upon even after the Idaho Supreme Court has
jurisdiction over a matter is "any motion under Rule 6o(a) or (b), LR.C.P." I. A. R.
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13(b)(6). Moreover, Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits the District
to correct clerical mistakes or omissions by motion or on its own,

for

the District Court to do so even after a case has been appealed (albeit with leave from
the appellate court). Fed. R. Civ. P. 6o(a). Consequently, it appears from both the Idaho
and Federal Civil Rules that a court retains limited jurisdiction to clarify its own orders.
Regardless, however, the Order is inconsequential to the outcome of Plaintiffs'
Motion for Reconsideration. Even in the absence of Judge Lodge's clarification, as
explained in Plaintiffs' prior briefing, federal case law provides that, for the purposes of
Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, where a plaintiff files a motion to amend
a complaint, the complaint is deemed filed as of the date of the filing of the motion, as
opposed to the date the complaint is actually filed after the granting of the motion. See

Mayes v. AT&T Info. Sys., Inc., 867 F.2d 1172, 1172 (8th Cir. 1989); Buller v. Owner
Operator Ind. Driver Risk Retention Group, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 768, 777 (S.D. Ill.
2006 )( collecting federal court cases holding amended complaint is deemed filed when
motion to amend is filed). The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized and acknowledged
this federal procedural rule in Terra-West, Inc. v. Idaho Mutual Trust, LLC, 150 Idaho
393, 398, 247 P.3d 620, 625 (2010). Consequently, even without Judge Lodge's Order,
the filing of the Motion for Leave to Amend on December 10, 2013, commenced the
action against Medical Defendants for the purposes of Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
B. U.S. Supreme Court Authority, Including Walker, Holds that When
There is a Federal Rule Directly on Point, the Federal Rule is Applied
Without Regard to Any Conflict Between Federal and State Law.
As Plaintiffs pointed out in their prior briefing, when a case is in federal court, no

matter what the jurisdictional basis, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply (see Fed.
4
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1; Califano v. Yamisaki, 442 U.S. 682, 699-700, 99 S.Ct. 2545, 61 L.Ed.2d 176
diversity cases, the federal courts apply federal law as to

matters of

procedure but substantive law of the relevant state. Hiatt v. Wadlow, 75 F.3d 1252,
1255 (8th Cir. 1996)(citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed.
1188 (1938)). Even Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 100 S.Ct. 1978, 64
L.Ed.2d 659 (1980), upon which Medical Defendants heavily rely, acknowledges "the
policies behind Erie and Ragan control the issue, whether, in the absence of a
federal rule directly on point, state service requirements which are an integral part
of the state statute of limitations should control in an action based on state law which is
filed in federal court under diversity jurisdiction." Id., 446 at 752, 100 S.Ct. at 1986.
This was reiterated a few sentences later, when the U.S. Supreme Court stated, "There is
simply no reason why, in the absence of a controlling federal rule, an action
based on state law which concededly would be barred in the state courts by the state
statute of limitations should proceed through litigation to judgment in federal court
solely because of the fortuity that there is diversity of citizenship between the litigants."

Id., 446 U.S. at 752, 100 S.Ct. at 1986. Although Medical Defendants argue repeatedly
that Walker governs because it addressed a statute of limitations, they fail to assert that
the statute of limitations in that state specifically required service of process for an
action to be "commenced" within the stated time period. Walker does not stand for the
proposition that state law trumps Rule 3 as to when a case "commences." In fact,

Walker specifically held that both the federal procedural rule and the state substantive
rule could co-exist. The holding of Walker by the U.S. Supreme Court is clearly stated in

Shady Grove:
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[I]n Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 100 S.Ct. 1978, 64
L.Ed.2d 659 (1980), .. we held that Rule 3 (which provides that a federal
civil action is " 'commenced' " by filing a complaint in federal court) did
not displace a state law providing that " '[a]n action shall be deemed
commenced, within the meaning of this article [the statute of limitations],
as to each defendant, at the date of the summons which is served on him
... .' "446 U.S. at 743, n. 4, 100 S.Ct. 1978 (quoting Okla. Stat., Tit. 12, § 97
(1971); alteration in original, emphasis added). Rule 3, we explained,
"governs the date from which various timing requirements of the Federal
Rules begin to run, but does not affect state statutes of limitations" or
tolling rules, which it did not "purpor[t] to displace." 446 U.S. at 751, 750,
100 S.Ct. 1978. The texts were therefore not in conflict. While our opinion
observed that the State's actual-service rule was (in the State's judgment)
an "integral part of the several policies served by the statute of
limitations," id. at 751, 100 S.Ct. 1978, nothing in our decision suggested
that a federal court may resolve an obvious conflict between the texts of
state and federal rules by resorting to the state law's ostensible objectives.

Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, PA. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 404, 130 S.
Ct. 1431, 1440, 176 L. Ed. 2d 311 n.6 (2010). Just like Walker, the federal procedure rule
in this case does not conflict with the substantive statute of limitations. In this case, at
best, the federal procedural rule arguably conflicts with a state procedural rule.
Fortunately, in Shady Grove, the U.S. Supreme Court more succinctly clarified
the analysis to be applied in this case: "We must first determine whether [the federal
rule in question] answers the question in dispute. If it does, it governs

[state] law

notwithstanding - unless it exceeds statutory authorization or Congress's rulemaking
power. We do not wade into Erie's murky waters unless the federal rule is inapplicable
or invalid.'' Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, PA. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 559
U.S. 393, 398, 130 S.Ct. 1431, 1437, 176 L.Ed.2d 311 (2010) (citing Burlington Northern

R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4-5, 107 S.Ct. 967, 94 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) and Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 463-64, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965)).
In the case at hand, there is no doubt that there is a federal rule which is directly
on point. Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that "[a] civil action is
6
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filing a complaint with the court." Rule 3
and

the federal case law,

the Idaho

that a

complaint is deemed filed for the purposes of Rule 3 when a defendant is added through
a motion for leave to amend on the date the motion for leave to amend is filed. See

above Section II.A. Because there is a federal rule directly on point, that rule must be
applied. See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 398. Further, there is no question that Rule 3
does not exceed statutory authorization or Congress's rulemaking power. As the U.S.
Supreme Court noted, "we have rejected every statutory challenge to a Federal Rule that
has come before us." Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 407, 130 S.Ct. at 1442. Therefore,
pursuant to Rule 3, the action against Medical Defendants is deemed to have been filed
on December 10, 2013, the date on which Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Leave to
Amend, and the action against Medical Defendants was commenced on December 10,
2013.
C. Even if it Were Necessary to Make a Determination as to Whether
There is a Conflict of Laws Between Federal and State Law, There is
no Conflict Because the Issue is not Addressed by State Law.
As the Walker court, as well as the Hanna court, acknowledged, in the absence of a

conflicting state procedure, the federal rules control. Walker, 446 U.S. at 747, 100 S.Ct.
at 1983 (citing Hanna, 380 U.S. at 465, 85 S.Ct. at 1140); see also National Equip.

Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 316, 84 S.Ct. 411, 414,
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L.Ed.2d 354 (1964).

Although there is a federal rule directly on point, as explained above, there is no Idaho
law specifically addressing when a suit "commences" against a defendant which has
been added via a motion for leave to amend a pre-existing complaint. In Griggs v. Nash,
116 Idaho 228, 234, 775 P.2d 120, 126 (1989), the facts only pertain to commencement
of an action against a third-party defendant. In Terra-West, Inc. v. Idaho Mutual Trust,
7

LLC, 150 Idaho 393, 247 P.3d 620 (2010), the facts addressed the commencement of a
cause

action as against a pre-existing defendant. Neither

these cases, nor any other

Idaho case, addresses commencement of an action against a defendant added to an
action through a motion for leave to amend.

Due to the absence of Idaho law on this

issue, there is no "direct collision" between federal law on the issue of commencement of
an action against a defendant where a motion for leave to amend has been filed and
Idaho law.

Therefore, federal law must be applied, and suit against the Medical

Defendants must be deemed commenced as of December 10, 2013, based on the clearly
set forth federal law.

D. Even if There Were a Direct Conflict Between Federal and Idaho Law
Regarding When a Suit is Commenced Against a Defendant Added via
a Motion For Leave to Amend, the Question of When an Action
Commences is a Procedural Issue, and Therefore, Under Shady
Grove, Federal Law Controls.
Medical Defendants make much of the fact that the Federal Rules do not trump the
state statute of limitations, and attempt to parlay case law pertaining to the substantive
nature of the statute of limitations to support its argument that Rule 3 of the Federal
Rules of Procedure does not apply. While Plaintiffs agree that the statute of limitations
itself is substantive law, as is noted in numerous case law quotations provided by
Medical Defendants, when the suit "commenced" is a procedural issue independent
from the statute of limitations. Medical Defendants' argument avoids any discussion
about whether the issue before the Court is procedural or substantive because the issue
has been decided already by the Idaho Supreme Court. See Terra-West, Inc. v. Idaho

Mutual Trust, LLC, 150 Idaho 393, 398 247 P.3d 620, 625 (2011).
There is no question that when this matter "commenced" against Medical
Defendants is a procedural issue. This is evident from the fact that both the Court, as
8
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as Medical Defendants, have suggested a number of different procedures that
could have followed in order to "commence" Plaintiffs' cause
Medical Defendants.

action against

See Opinion and Order Granting Defendants' Motion for

Summary Judgment, p. 6-7; EIRMC Opp. Memo., p.

11.

Moreover, the Idaho Supreme

Court acknowledges in Terra-West that when a case "commences" is a procedural issue.

See Terra-West, 150 Idaho 393, 397-98 (2010) (stating, "there is a substantial difference
between the procedure for filing an original complaint under I.R.C.P. 3(a) and the
procedure for filing an amended complaint pursuant to I.R.C.P. 15(a)"; and "the
Supreme Court has the inherent 'power to fashion the procedures necessary to perform
[its] duties."'). In fact, in Terra-West, the Idaho Supreme Court explicitly explained that
its interpretation of when an action commences is procedural:
While the Legislature has the power to enact substantive laws, the
Supreme Court has the inherent "power to fashion the procedures
necessary to perform [its] duties." City of Boise v. Ada County, 147 Idaho
794,802,215 P.3d 514,522 (2009). In that case we observed:
[T]he Legislature has recognized the courts' inherent power
in this regard by enactment of [Idaho Code] section 1-1622
which] provides:
When jurisdiction is, by the code, or by any
other statute, conferred on a court or judicial
officer all means necessary to carry it into effect
are also given; and in the exercise of the
jurisdiction if the course of proceedings be not
specially pointed out by this code, or the
statute, any suitable process or mode of
proceeding may be adopted which may appear
most conformable to the spirit of this code."
Id.at 803,215 P.3d at 523. In other words, because the Legislature is silent
on this issue, it is the Court's responsibility to apply a meaning of
"commence proceedings" that is consistent with the spirit and policy
of Idaho's mechanic's lien statute. Under the approach urged by Idaho
Mutual a plaintiff would inevitably be forced to incur additional litigation

9

costs associated with filing a separate action and scarce judicial resources
would be wasted by adding an unnecessary case to the court's calendar.

Inc. v. Idaho Mutual Trust, LLC, 150 Idaho 393, 398 247 P.3d 620, 625
(2011)(bold emphasis added). It is not the Legislature that has defined "commence
proceedings," but the Idaho Supreme Court, as a procedural issue.
Moreover, Shady Grove further indicates that when this action "commenced"
against Medical Defendants is a procedural issue, and is governed by Rule 3 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In Shady Grove, the U.S. Supreme Court considered
whether the plaintiff could file a class action in diversity to recover interest owed to it or
others pursuant to the class action provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure or if such an action was precluded by a New York law which disallowed class
actions to recover a "penalty" such as statutory interest. While the U.S. Supreme Court
made a preliminary determination that Rule 23 was directly on point, and therefore
applied regardless of New York state law, the Court engaged in an Erie analysis as well.
In deciding that the issue before it was one of procedure, and that, therefore, Rule 23
was the correct law to be applied, the Court noted:
The test is not whether the rule affects a litigant's substantive rights;
most procedural rules do. Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326
U.S. 438,445, 66 S.Ct. 242, 90 L.Ed.185 (1946). What matters is what the
rule itself regulates: If it governs only "the manner and the means" by
which the litigants' rights are "enforced," it is valid; if it alters "the rules of
decision by which [the] court will adjudicate [those] rights, it is not. 446,
66 S.Ct. 242 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 407, 1442.
The U.S. Supreme Court further went on to clarify Hanna:

Hanna unmistakably expressed the same understanding that compliance
of a Federal Rule with the Enabling Act is to be assessed by consulting the
Rule itself, and not its effects in individual applications:

10
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"[T]he court has been instructed to apply the Federal Rule,
and can refuse to do so only if the Advisory Committee, this
Court, and Congress erred in their prima facie judgment that
the Rule in question transgresses neither the terms of the
Enabling Act nor constitution restrictions."
In sum, it is not the substantive or procedural nature or purpose of the
affected state law that matters, but the substantive or procedural nature of
the Federal Rule. We have held since Sibbach, and reaffirmed repeatedly,
that the validity of a Federal Rule depends entirely upon whether it
regulates procedure.

Id. at 410.
While Medical Defendants assert that Plaintiffs' reliance upon Hanna is
misplaced and outdated because Hanna was later qualified by Walker and other
subsequent lower federal court decisions, Medical Defendants fail to acknowledge that

Shady Grove has clarified both Hanna and Walker, explaining that as long as the
Federal Rule in question both directly addresses the issue before the Court, and
regulates procedure, the Federal Rule must be applied. Such is the case here, where
Rule 3, and the federal case law interpreting Rule 3, are directly on point with regard to
when Plaintiffs' action against Medical Defendants commenced, and further, regulate
procedure. Rule 3 does nothing to alter or toll the Idaho statute of limitations. As this
Court previously acknowledged, both parties agree that the statute of limitations expired
on December

19, 2013.

Consequently, Rule

3

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

must be applied, and Plaintiffs' action against Medical Defendants must be considered
to have commenced on December 10,

2013,

well within the statute oflimitations.

11

III.

CONCLUSION

Motion for Reconsideration.

Dated this 4th day of September,

HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO,
P.L.L.C.

2014

aQhdwd 2~~
DeAnne Casperson f
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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day of September, 2014, I caused a true and correct copy
the foregoing to be served via facsimile on the following:
J. Michael Wheiler
Richard R. Friess
THOMSEN HOLMAN WHEILER, PLLC
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Attorneys for Defendant James Taylor, D.O.
Marvin M. Smith
SMITH & BANKS PLLC
2010 Jennie Lee Dr.
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Attorneys for Defendant EIRMC
William Dryden
CraigYabui
ELAM&BURKE
251 E. Front St., Ste. 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701
Douglas B. King
Brian D. Burbrink
WOODEN & MCLAUGHLIN LLP
One Indiana Square, Ste. 1800
211 N. Pennsylvania
Indianapolis, IN 46204
Attorneys for Defendants Cook Incorporated, Cook Medical Incorporated, and Cook
Medical Technologies, LLC
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DeAnne Casperson/'
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THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL Dl~Vifl~fil'fiJ)FptfJJ;

CAROL ENGLISH and ERIC ENGLISH,
wife and husband,

Case No. CV-2013-4868

Plaintiffs,
V.

N

en

COOK IN CORPORATED, and Indiana
Corporation; COOK MEDICAL
IN CORPORA TED, and Indiana
Corporation; COOK MEDICAL
TECHNOLOGIES, LLC; and Indiana
LLC; JAMES TAYLOR, D.O.;
EASTERN IDAHO HEALTH
SERVICES, INC. dba EASTERN IDAHO
REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, an
Idaho Corporation; and DOES 1-20,

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

Defendants.

I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE
Carol and Eric English ("Plaintiffs") allege that on September 17, 2011, Eastern Idaho
Health Services, Inc. ("EIRMC") and Dr. James Taylor ("Dr. Taylor") (collectively referred to as
the "Medical Defendants") committed medical negligence that injured Carol while using a
particular medical device.

On September 13, 2013, Plaintiffs filed this suit against Cook

Incorporated; Cook Medical Incorporated; Cook Medical Technologies, LLC; and Does 1-20 (the
"Cook Defendants") alleging products liability theories involving the medical device used on
September 17, 2011.

On September 16, 2013, the Idaho State Board of Medicine received

Plaintiffs' claim for medical malpractice pre-litigation hearing. On September I 7, 2013, Plaintiffs

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
English v. Cook Inc., eta!, cv-2013-4868

filed an amended complaint. Plaintiffs did not include the Medical Defendants nor any medical
m

On October 31,

13, the Cook Defendants filed a Notice of Removal that removed this

state action to federal court based on diversity of citizenship. On December 10, 2013, Plaintiffs
filed a Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File
Second Amended Complaint was not served upon the Medical Defendants. On January 16, 2014,
the federal court granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint and
Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint the same day. In Plaintiffs' Second Amended
Complaint, Plaintiffs' claimed medical negligence and named the Medical Defendants.
On January 17, 2014, Plaintiffs and Cook Defendants stipulated that the Second Amended
Complaint deprived the federal court of jurisdiction. On January 21, 2014, the federal court
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction and the case was remanded back to Idaho State Court.
On January 27, 2014, Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint, which was already filed
in federal court, in the Idaho state action.

On February 25, 2014, EIRMC was served with

Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint. Dr. Taylor was served on March 21, 2014.
On March 14, 2014, EIRMC filed Defendant Eastern Idaho Health Services, Inc. DBA
Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center's Motion for Summary Judgment ("EIRMC's Motion for
Summary Judgment"). On April 4, 2014, Dr. Taylor filed Defendant James Taylor, D.O.'s First
Motion for Summary Judgment ("Dr. Taylor's Motion for Summary Judgment"). Both motions
for summary judgment were granted. On July 7, 2014, Plaintiffs filled a motion to reconsider.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The decision to grant or deny a request for reconsideration generally rests in the sound
discretion of the trial court. Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 21 P.3d 908 (2001). See also, Watson
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
English v. Cook Inc., eta!, cv-2013-4868
2

Int'! Transp. Corp., 121 Idaho 643, 827 P.2d 656 (1992); Slaathaug v. Allstate Ins.

On a motion for reconsideration pursuant to I.R.C.P. l l(a)(2)(B), the trial court should take
into account any new facts presented by the moving party that bear on the correctness of the
interlocutory order. Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat 'l Bank, 118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d
1026, 1037 (1990). A party filing a motion to reconsider pursuant to Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B) carries the
burden of bringing to the trial court's attention the new facts. Id.; See also Devil Creek Ranch,
Inc. v. Cedar Mesa Reservoir & Canal Co., 126 Idaho 202,879 P.2d 1135 (1994).

The trial court has discretion to grant or deny a motion to alter or amend under LR.C.P.
59(e):
A Rule 59(e) motion to amend a judgment is addressed to the discretion of
the court. An order denying a motion made under Rule 59( e) to alter or amend a
judgment is appealable, but only on the question of whether there has been a
manifest abuse of discretion. Rule 59(e) proceedings afford the trial court the
opportunity to correct errors both of fact or law that had occurred in its proceedings;
it thereby provides a mechanism for corrective action short of an appeal. Such
proceedings must of necessity, therefore, be directed to the status of the case as it
existed when the court rendered the decision upon which the judgment is based.
Coeur d'Alene Mining Co., 118 Idaho at 832, 800 P.2d at 1037, citing Lowe v. Lym, 103 Idaho

259,263,646 P.2d 1030, 1034 (Ct. App. 1982).

III.
ANALYSIS

In the Opinion and Order Granting Medical Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment,
this Court held Plaintiffs' December 10, 2013, Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended
Complaint did not commence the action and Plaintiffs did not commence the action until after the
statute of limitations had expired. Plaintiffs now contend, in their Motion for Reconsideration,
"this Court failed to acknowledge or recognize the federal court's order with no analysis as to

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
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underlying issue is procedural or substantive." Plaintiffs· Memorandum in Support of
p.3.
underlying issue is procedural or substantive is paramount because,

whether the
issue is procedural, as

Defendants claim, it must be governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and not the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure. Id
The primary holding in Erie Railroad v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938), is
when a federal court exercises diversity jurisdiction, the forum state's substantive law controls and
federal procedural law controls. Therefore, an analysis must be done on whether the issue of
determining the date in which the statute of limitations commences is procedural or substantive.
Plaintiffs argue the issue at hand is procedural and frame their argument in terms that "had
the Plaintiffs followed a different procedure (filing a new action instead of moving for leave to
amend), Plaintiffs' claim would have survived." Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration, p.5. While this statement made by Plaintiffs may be true, we are not inclined to

base our decision solely on such a statement without additional supporting authority. Rather, this
Court adopts the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446
U.S. 740, 741, 100 S. Ct. 1978, 1980, 64 L. Ed. 2d. 659,663 (1980), holding: "In our view, in
diversity actions Rule 3 governs the date from which various timing requirements of the Federal
Rules begin to run, but does not affect state statutes of limitations." Id at 7 51.
The Walker Court even provided an Erie analysis on the issue of whether statute of
limitations questions are procedural or substantive in nature. That Court applied its previous
holding in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 65 S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed. 2079 (1945), to the
facts in the Walker suit:
In construing Erie we noted that "[i]n essence, the intent of that decision
was to insure that, in all cases where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
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because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation
in the federal court should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine
the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court." 326 U.S., at l 09,
at 1470. We concluded that the state statute of limitations should be
applied. "Plainly enough, a statute that would eompletely bar recovery in a suit if
brought in a State court bears on a State-created right vitally and not merely
formally or negligibly. As to consequences that so intimately affect recovery or
non-recovery a federal court in a diversity case should follow State law." Id, at
110, 65 S.Ct. at 1470.

Id. at 745 (emphasis added).
In other words, the Walker Court held that in a suit brought in federal court, solely on the basis of
diversity jurisdiction, the result in federal court should be substantially the same as it would be in
State court as long as substantive rules determine the outcome of the litigation. In that case, the
Court held determining the suit based on the statute of limitations was substantive; therefore, the
state law controlled.
Further, a reading of the Practice Commentaries of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 3 and
4 show they are not to be applied to statute oflimitations questions. A portion of the commentary
of Rule 3 states:
When diversity is the jurisdictional basis for the federal action, however, Rule 3
emphatically does not govern for purposes of the statute of limitations. The rule
applicable in a diversity case to determine whether the statute of limitations has
been satisfied is taken from the law of the state in which the federal court happens
to be sitting.
The case that accounts for the perils of the diversity plaintiff who relies on Federal
Rule 3 is Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 100 S.Ct. 1978 (1980). It is
discussed, with a series of connected matters, in the course of the Commentaries on
Rule 4, below. See, e.g., Commentary C4-37.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 3 Practice Commentary U.S. Code Ann. by David D. Siegel.
In addition, a portion of the commentary of Rule 4 provides additional insight:
Indeed, in some instances even a lawyer with an intimate knowledge of Rule 4 can
get tripped up, as in a case based on diversity of citizenship, where, for a statute of
limitations measure, neither Rule 3 nor Rule 4 governs. State law does, but nothing
on the face of either rule warns of that because it comes from case law.
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
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P. 4 Practice Commentary U.S. Code
commencement

the

by David
is independent

Siegel.
statute

the regular substantive requirements of the statute do not apply.

other words, the

statute of limitations may be substantive in nature, but the commencement of the statute of
limitations is procedural. We disagree. Several courts have held, specifically, the commencement
of the statute of limitations is substantive. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals cited Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York, along with several other cases in stating "As all parties acknowledge, it is well

established that in diversity cases state law governs not only the limitations period but also the
commencement of the limitations period." Cantor Fitzgeraldv. Lutnick, 313 F.3d 704, 709 (2002).
Further that court stated, "A state's rules providing for the start and length of the statute of
limitations is substantive law." Id. at 710 (citing Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 87 F.3d 231,235 (8th
Cir.1996), afj'd, 521 U.S. 179, 117 S.Ct. 1984, 138 L.Ed.2d 373 (1997); Nev. Power Co. v.
Monsanto Co., 955 F.2d 1304, 1306 (9th Cir.1992)). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has also

held commencement of the statute of limitations, in a federal diversity case, is controlled by state
law. In Sain v. City ofBend, the court referenced Supreme Court precedent where it clarified when
Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is applied and when the state's law is applied to
issues concerning the commencement of a suit for statute of limitations purposes, "Thus, after
Walker and West, we know the following: Rule 3 does not commence a suit based on state law for

purposes of the statute of limitations (Walker). However, Rule 3 does commence a suit based on
federal law that has a statute of limitations borrowed from federal law (West)." Sain v. City of
Bend, 309 F.3d 1134, 1137-38 (9th Cir. 2002). Because the case at hand is a diversity claim based

on state law, the state substantive law controls. The holding in Sain is persuasive and we chose to
adopt this rationale. Therefore, the commencement of the statute of limitations is viewed in the
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same

as

nature

statute oflimitations questions in regards to whether it is procedural or substantive
as a result,

law

Plaintiff argues that because the federal rule and the state rule do not conflict, the federal
rule must be applied. Given the copious case law applying Erie to the issue of whether the
commencement of the statute of limitations is procedural or substantive, this Court does not
attribute significant weight to that argument. Plaintiff correctly addresses the first prong of Erie
as making a determination if a federal law adequately addresses the issue at hand. Erie R.R. Co.
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 740, 100 S. Ct. 1978, 64 L.Ed.2d 659 (1980). It is only when in the absence
of a federal law directly on point that the Erie analysis comes into play. We do not wade into
Erie's murky waters unless the federal rule is inapplicable or invalid. Shady Grove Orthopedic
Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393,398, 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1437, 176 L. Ed. 2d 311
(2010). In this case, the federal rule does not directly conflict with state law to the extent it renders
it invalid. If laws controlling the commencement of the statute of limitations were trumped by
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3, courts would not have even addressed whether the issue is
procedural or substantive. In addition to the commentaries of Rules 3 and 4, several courts,
including the Second and Ninth District Courts of Appeal, have specifically addressed whether the
commencement of the statute oflimitations is procedural or substantive. Therefore, because these
courts have analyzed this issue as procedural or substantive, according to Erie, they must have first
made a determination that Rule 3 does not trump state laws addressing the commencement of the
statute of limitations. If the courts would have made a finding that the federal rule was adequate,
under Erie, an analysis on whether the issue is procedural or substantive would have never been
done.

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
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addressed m
V.

Opinion and Order Granting Defendants Motions for Summary
is the controlling Idaho law

defines

action was

co1mnne11ce:a for statute of limitations purposes. Accordingly Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File
a Second Amended Complaint did not commence the action because the parties did not have
adequate notice. Under controlling Idaho Law, Plaintiffs did not commence the actions against
EIRMC and Dr. Taylor until after the statute of limitations had expired.

IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court holds the commencement of the statute oflimitations
is a substantive issue and state law controls. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration
is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this ~_,__day of October, 2014.
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
CAROL ENGLISH and ERIC ENGLISH,
wife and husband,
NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiffs/Appellants,

Case No. cv-2013-4868

VS.

JAMES TAYLOR, D.0.; EASTERN IDAHO
HEALTH SERVICES, INC. dba EASTERN
IDAHO REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
an Idaho Corporation,,

Judge Shindurling

Defendants and Appellees.

TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, JAMES TAYLOR, D.0. AND

EASTERN IDAHO HEALTH SERVICES, INC. DBA EASTERN IDAHO REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER, AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEYS:

1

MARVIN M. SMITH AND

3

IGINAL

K. SMITH, SMITH & BANKS, 2010 JENNIE LEE DRIVE, IDAHO FALLS, ID

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS EASTERN IDAHO REGIONAL MEDICAL
AND MICHAEL WHEILER AND RICHARD FRIESS, THOMSEN HOLMAN
WHEILER, 2635 CHANNING WAY, IDAHO FALLS, ID 83404, ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT JAMES TAYLOR, D.O., AND THE CLERK OF THE IDAHO SEVENTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
The above-named Plaintiffs/Appellants appeal against the above-named

1.

Defendants/Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the trial court's Opinion and
Order Granting Medical Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment, issued June 23,
2014, the trial court's Opinion and Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for
Reconsideration, issued October 29, 2014, and the trial court's Judgment of Dismissal
with Prejudice, dated June 30, 2014 (Honorable Judge Shindurling presiding).
2.

Plaintiffs/Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court,

and the judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders
under and pursuant to Rules 11(a)(1) and 11(a)(3) of the Idaho Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
3.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the appellants then

intend to assert in the appeal include:
a. The trial court's erroneous dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiffs' causes of
action against Defendants James Taylor, D.0. and Eastern Idaho Regional
Medical Center.
b. The trial court's entry of judgment in favor of Defendants James Taylor,
D.O. and Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center.
2

c. The trial court's erroneous denial of Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration.
Plaintiffs/Appellants request the preparation

the rar,nr1, 0

in electronic format of the following
a. The May 5,

2014

hearing on Defendants'/Appellees' motions for summary

judgment; and
b. The September 8,

2014

hearing on Plaintiffs'/Appellants' motion for

reconsideration.
5.

The Plaintiffs/Appellants request the following documents be included in

the clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28 of the Idaho
Rules of Appellate Procedure:
a. Defendant James Taylor, D.0.'s motion for summary judgment;
b. Defendant James Taylor, D.0.'s memorandum in support of motion for
summary judgment and all exhibits and affidavits attached thereto or
referenced therein;
c. Plaintiffs Eric and Carol English's memorandum in opposition to
Defendant James Taylor, D.O.'s motion for summary judgment and all
exhibits and affidavits attached thereto or referenced therein;
d. Defendant James Taylor, D.0.'s reply memorandum in support of motion
for summary judgment and all exhibits and affidavits attached thereto or
referenced therein;
e. Defendant Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center's motion for summary
judgment;

3

3

f.

Defendant Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center's memorandum in
support

its motion for summary judgment

attached

or referenced therein;

all exhibits and affidavits

g. Plaintiffs Eric and Carol English's memorandum in opposition to
Defendant Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center's motion for summary
judgment and all exhibits and affidavits attached thereto or referenced
therein;
h. Defendant Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center's reply memorandum
in support of its motion for summary judgment and all exhibits and
affidavits attached thereto or referenced therein;
1.

The trial court's Opinion and Order Granting Medical Defendants'
Motions for Summary Judgment;

J. The trial court's Judgment of Dismissal with Prejudice;
k. Plaintiffs Eric and Carol English's motion for reconsideration;

1. Plaintiffs Eric and Carol English's memorandum in support of motion for
reconsideration and all exhibits and affidavits attached thereto or
referenced therein;
m. Defendant James Taylor, D.O.'s memorandum in opposition to Plaintiffs
Eric and Carol English's motion for reconsideration and all exhibits and
affidavits attached thereto or referenced therein;
n. Defendants Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center's memorandum in
opposition to Plaintiffs Eric and Carol English's motion for
reconsideration and all exhibits and affidavits attached thereto or
referenced therein;
4

o. Plaintiffs Eric and Carol English's reply memorandum in support of
motion for reconsideration

exhibits

affidavits attached

or
p. The trial court's Opinion and Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for
Reconsideration.
6.

I certify:
a. That service of the notice of appeal has been made upon the reporter of the
proceedings at issue as named below:
1.

Mary Fox, Seventh District Court, Bonneville County Courthouse,
605 North Capital Avenue, Idaho Falls, ID 83402.

b. That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fees for
preparation of the designated reporter's transcript as required by Rule 24;
c. That the estimated fees for preparation of the clerk's record have been
paid;
d. The all appellate filing fees have been paid; and
e. Service has been made upon all other parties required to be served
pursuant to Rule 20.
Dated this l h a y of December, 2014 HOLDEN, KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO

DeAnne Casperso~

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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I

the foregoing to

served via facsimile and

Mail on the following:

Marvin M. Smith
Marvin K. Smith
Smith & Banks
2010 Jennie Lee Drive
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Attorneys for Defendants Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center
Michael Wheiler
Richard Friess
Thomsen Holman Wheiler
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Attorneys for Defendant James Taylor, D.O.
William Dryden
CraigYabui
ELAM&BURKE
251 E. Front St., Ste. 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701
Douglas B. King
Brian D. Burbrink
WOODEN & MCLAUGHLIN LLP
One Indiana Square, Ste. 1800
211 N. Pennsylvania
Indianapolis, IN 46204
Attorneys for Defendants Cook Incorporated, Cook Medical Incorporated, and Cook
Medical Technologies, LLC
Mary Fox
Seventh District Court
Bonneville County Courthouse
605 North Capital Avenue
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OFfHE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
CAROL ENGLISH and ERIC ENGLISH,
wife and husband,
Plaintiffs,
VS.

COOK INCORPORATED, an Indiana
corporation; COOK MEDICAL
INCORPORATED, an Indiana Corporation;
COOK MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,
an Indiana LLC; JAMES TAYLOR, D.O.;
EASTERN IDAHO HEALTH SERVICES,
INC. dba EASTERN IDAHO REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER, an Idaho Corporation;
and DOES 1-20,

Case No. cv-2013-4868
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
RULE 54(b) CERTIFIFCATION OF
JUDGMENTS OF DISMISSAL OF
MEDICAL DEFENDANTS AND RULE
54(b) CERTIFICATION

Defendants.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Opinion and Order Granting Medical
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment, dated June 27, 2014; Judgment of
Dismissal with Prejudice Against Eastern Idaho Health Services, Inc., dated June 30,
2014; Judgment of Dismissal with Prejudice Against James Taylor, D.O.; and Opinion
and Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration, dated October 29, 2014, are
certified as final.
Dated this

d0ty of January, 2015.

ECEIV
JAN 1 5 2015
BY:_ _ _ _ __

Bruce L. Pickett
District Judge

336

\JRIGINAL

RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATION

respect
hereby CERTIFIED,

issues determined by the above judgments or orders it
accordance v\rith Rule 54(b),

that the Court has

determined that there is no just reason for delay of the entry of a final judgment and
that the Court has and does hereby direct that the above judgment and orders shall be
final judgments upon which execution may issue and an appeal may be taken as
provided by the Idaho Appellate Rules.

Dated this)cf2;.-day of January,

2015.

~~

~

...

~~--

·-

~Bruce~~

District Judge

2 - ORDER ON RULE 54(b) CERTIFIFCATION OF JUDGMENTS OF DISMISSAL OF MEDICAL
DEFENDANTS AND RULE 54(B) CERTIFICATION
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
nor,"'n"

certify that on this~ day of January, 2015, I caused a true
via

Mail on

Ralph L. Dewsnup
David R. Olsen
Jessica A. Andrew
Dewsnup King & Olsen
36 South State Street, Suite 2400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-0024
Telephone: (801) 533-0400
Facsimile: (801) 363-4218
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
DeAnne Casperson
Holden Kidwell Hahn & Crapo, PLLC
1000 Riverwalk Dr., Ste. 200
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0130
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Marvin M. Smith
Marvin K. Smith
Smith & Banks
2010 Jennie Lee Drive
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Attorneys for Defendants Eastern Idaho
Regional Medical Center

copy of

following:

Michael Wheiler
Richard Friess
Thomsen Holman Wheiler
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Attorneys for Defendant James Taylor, D.O.
William Dryden
CraigYabui
ELAM&BURKE
251 E. Front St., Ste. 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701
Attorneys for Defendants Cook Incorporated,
Cook Medical Incorporated, and Cook
Medical Technologies, LLC
Douglas B. King
Brian D. Burbrink
Christopher D. Lee
WOODEN & MCLAUGHLIN LLP
One Indiana Square, Ste. 1800
211 N. Pennsylvania
Indianapolis, IN 46204
Attorneys for Defendants Cook Incorporated,
Cook Medical Incorporated, and Cook
Medical Technologies, LLC

3 - ORDER ON RULE 54(b) CERTIFIFCATION OF JUDGMENTS OF DISMISSAL OF MEDICAL
DEFENDANTS AND RULE 54(B) CERTIFICATION

3

DeAnne Casperson
dcasperson@holdenlegal.com
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO
1000 Riverwalk Dr., Ste. 200
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0130
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Ralph L. Dewsnup (UT Bar #876)pro hac vice
rdews@dkolaw.com
David R. Olsen (UT Bar #2458)pro hac vice
dolse@dkolaw.com
Jessica A. Andrew (UT Bar #12433)pro hac vice
jandrew@dkolaw.com
DEWSNUP, KING & OLSEN
36 South State Street, Suite 2400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-0024
Telephone: (801) 533-0400
Facsimile: (801) 363-4218

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OFTHE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN ANDFOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
CAROL ENGLISH and ERIC ENGLISH,
wife and husband,

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiffs/Appellants,

Case No. cv-2013-4868

vs.
JAMES TAYLOR, D.O.; EASTERN IDAHO
HEALTH SERVICES, INC. dba EASTERN
IDAHO REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
an Idaho Corporation,,

Judge Shindurling/ Judge Pickett

Defendants and Appellees.

TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, JAMES TAYLOR, D.O. AND

EASTERN IDAHO HEALTH SERVICES, INC. DBA EASTERN IDAHO REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER, AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEYS:

MARVIN M. SMITH AND

MARVIN K. SMITH, SMITH & BANKS, 2010 JENNIE LEE DRIVE, IDAHO FALLS, ID
1

g

I i A

83404, ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS EASTERN IDAHO REGIONAL MEDICAL
AND MICHAEL WHEILER AND RICHARD FRIESS, THOMSEN HOLMAN
WHEILER, 2635 CHANNING WAY, IDAHO FALLS, ID 83404, ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT JAMES TAYLOR, D.O., AND THE CLERK OF THE IDAHO SEVENTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
The above-named Plaintiffs/ Appellants appeal against the above-named

1.

Defendants/Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the trial court's Opinion and
Order Granting Medical Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment, issued June 23,
2014,

the

trial

court's

Opinion

and

Order

Denying

Plaintiffs'

Motion for

Reconsideration, issued October 29, 2014, and the trial court's Judgment of Dismissal
with Prejudice, dated June 30, 2014 (Honorable Judge Shindurling presiding).These
rulings were certified as final pursuant to Rule 54(b) on January 20, 2015.
2.

Plaintiffs/Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court,

and the judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders
under and pursuant to Rules 11(a)(1) and 11(a)(3) of the Idaho Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
3.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the appellants then

intend to assert in the appeal include:
a. The trial court's erroneous dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiffs' causes of
action against Defendants James Taylor, D.0. and Eastern Idaho Regional
Medical Center.
b. The trial court's entry of judgment in favor of Defendants James Taylor,
D.O. and Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center.
2

4

c. The trial court's erroneous denial of Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration.
The Plaintiffs/Appellants

preparation

the reporters'

in electronic format of the following hearings:
a. The May 5,

2014

hearing on Defendants'/Appellees' motions for summary

judgment; and
b. The September 8,

2014

hearing on Plaintiffs'/Appellants' motion for

reconsideration.
5.

The Plaintiffs/Appellants request the following documents be included in

the clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28 of the Idaho
Rules of Appellate Procedure:
a. Defendant James Taylor, D.0.'s motion for summary judgment;
b. Defendant James Taylor, D.O.'s memorandum in support of motion for
summary judgment and all exhibits and affidavits attached thereto or
referenced therein;
c. Plaintiffs Eric and Carol English's memorandum in opposition to
Defendant James Taylor, D.0.'s motion for summary judgment and all
exhibits and affidavits attached thereto or referenced therein;
d. Defendant James Taylor, D.0.'s reply memorandum in support of motion
for summary judgment and all exhibits and affidavits attached thereto or
referenced therein;
e. Defendant Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center's motion for summary
judgment;

3

f. Defendant Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center's memorandum in
support

motion for

judgment

all exhibits

affidavits

attached thereto or referenced therein;
g. Plaintiffs Eric and Carol English's memorandum in opposition to
Defendant Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center's motion for summary
judgment and all exhibits and affidavits attached thereto or referenced
therein;
h. Defendant Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center's reply memorandum
in support of its motion for summary judgment and all exhibits and
affidavits attached thereto or referenced therein;
1.

The trial court's Opinion and Order Granting Medical Defendants'
Motions for Summary Judgment;

J.

The trial court's Judgment of Dismissal with Prejudice;

k. Plaintiffs Eric and Carol English's motion for reconsideration;

1. Plaintiffs Eric and Carol English's memorandum in support of motion for
reconsideration and all exhibits and affidavits attached thereto or
referenced therein;
m. Defendant James Taylor, D.0.'s memorandum in opposition to Plaintiffs
Eric and Carol English's motion for reconsideration and all exhibits and
affidavits attached thereto or referenced therein;
n. Defendants Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center's memorandum in
opposition

to

Plaintiffs

Eric

and

Carol

English's

motion

for

reconsideration and all exhibits and affidavits attached thereto or
referenced therein;
4

4

o. Plaintiffs Eric and Carol English's reply memorandum in support of
motion

reconsideration and all exhibits and affidavits attached thereto

or referenced therein;
p. The trial court's Opinion and Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for
Reconsideration;
q. The trial court's Order Granting Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification of
Judgments of Dismissal of Medical Defendants and Rule 54(b)
Certification.
6.

I certify:
a. That service of the amended notice of appeal has been made upon the
reporter of the proceedings at issue as named below:
1.

Mary Fox, Seventh District Court, Bonneville County Courthouse,
605 North Capital Avenue, Idaho Falls, ID 83402.

b. That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fees for
preparation of the designated reporter's transcript as required by Rule 24;
c. That the estimated fees for preparation of the clerk's record have been
paid;
d. The all appellate filing fees have been paid; and
e. Service has been made upon all other parties required to be served
pursuant to Rule 20.
HOLDEN, KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO

Dated t h i s ~ of January, 2015

~A.4~4.c~\:/~

DeAnne Casperson ~
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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I
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~ay January, 2015, I '-' -"'_.....,....,...,. a true
the foregoing to be served via U.S. Mail on the following:

correct copy

Marvin M. Smith
Marvin K. Smith
Smith & Banks
2010 Jennie Lee Drive
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Attorneys for Defendants Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center
Michael Wheiler
Richard Friess
Thomsen Holman Wheiler
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Attorneys for Defendant James Taylor, D.O.
William Dryden
CraigYabui
ELAM&BURKE
251 E. Front St., Ste. 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701
Attorneys for Defendants Cook Incorporated, Cook Medical Incorporated, and Cook
Medical Technologies, LLC
Douglas B. King
Brian D. Burbrink
WOODEN & MCLAUGHLIN LLP
One Indiana Square, Ste. 1800
211 N. Pennsylvania
Indianapolis, IN 46204
Attorneys for Defendants Cook Incorporated, Cook Medical Incorporated, and Cook
Medical Technologies, LLC
Mary Fox
Seventh District Court
Bonneville County Courthouse
605 North Capital Avenue
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
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FROM-

DeAnne Casperson
dcaspersQn@holdenlegal.com
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO
1000 Riverwalk Dr., Ste. 200
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0130
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Ralph L. Dewsnup (UT Bar #876)pro hac vice
rdews@dkolaw.com
David R. Olsen (UT Bar #2458)pro hac vice
do1se@dkolaw.com
,Jessica A. Andrew (UT Bar #12433)pro hac vice
jandrew@dkolaw.com
DEWSNUP, KING & OLSEN
36 South State Street, Suite 2400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-0024
Telephone: (801) 533-0400
Facsimile: (801) 363-4218

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OFfHE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
CAROL ENGLISH and ERIC ENGLISH,

wife and husband,
SECOND AMENDED NOTICE OF

Plaintiffs/Appellants,

APPEAL

vs.
Case No. cv-2013-4868
JAMES TAYLOR, D.O.; EASTERN IDAHO
HEALTH SERVICES, INC. dba EASTERN
IDAHO REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
an Idaho Corporation,,

Judge Shindurling/Judge Pickett

Defendants and Appellees.

TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, JAMES TAYLOR, D.O. AND

EASTERN IDAHO HEALTH SERVICES, INC. DBA EASTERN IDAHO REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER, AND THE PARTY'S ATIORNEYS:

MARVIN M. SMITH AND

MARVIN K. SMITH, SMITH & BANKS, 2010 JENNIE LEE DRIVE, IDAHO FALLS, ID
1

4

P0003/0008 F-448

1 10:

83404, ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS EASTERN IDAHO REGIONAL MEDICAL
AND MICHAEL WHEILER AND RICHARD FRIESS, THOMSEN HOLMAN
2635 CHANNING WAY, IDAHO FALLS,

83404, ATTORNEYS FOR

DEFENDANT JAMES TAYLOR, D.O., AND THE CLERK OF THE IDAHO SEVENTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
The above-named Plaintiffs/Appellants appeal against the above-named

1.

Defendants/Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the trial court's Opinion and
Order Granting Medical Defendants' Motions for Summary ,Judgment, issued June 23,
2014,

the trial court's Opinion and Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for

Reconsideration, issued October 29,
with Prejudice, dated June

2014,

30, 2014

and the trial court's Judgment of Dismissal

(Honorable Judge Shindurling presiding).These

rulings were certified as final pursuant to Rule 54(b) on January 20, 2015.
Plaintiffs/Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court,

2.

and the judgments or orders described in paragraph

1

above are appealable orders

under and pursuant to Rules 11(a)(1) and 11(a)(3) of the Idaho Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
3.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the appellants then

intend to assert in the appeal include:
a. The trial court's erroneous dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiffs' causes of
action against Defendants James Taylor, D.O. and Eastern Idaho Regional
Medical Center.
b. The trial court's entry of judgment in favor of Defendants James Taylor,
D.O. and Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center.
2
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c. The trial court's erroneous denial of Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration.
The Plaintiffs/Appellants request the preparation of the reporters'
in electronic format of the following hearings:
a. The May 5,

2014

hearing on Defendants'/Appellees' motions for summary

judgment; and
b. The September 8,

2014

hearing on Plaintiffs'/Appellants' motion for

reconsideration.
5.

The Plaintiffs/Appellants request the following documents be included in

the clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28 of the Idaho
Rules of Appellate Procedure:
a. Defendant James Taylor, D.O.'s motion for summary judgment, filed April
4, 2014;

b. Defendant James Taylor, D.O.'s memorandum in support of motion for
summary judgment and all exhibits and affidavits attached thereto or
referenced therein, filed April 4, 2014;
c. Plaintiffs Eric and Carol English's memorandum in opposition to
Defendant James Taylor, D.O.'s motion for summary judgment and all
exhibits and affidavits attached thereto or referenced therein, filed April
18, 2014;

d. Defendant James Taylor, D.O.'s reply memorandum in support of motion
for summary judgment and all exhibits and affidavits attached thereto or
referenced therein, filed April 22,

2014;

e. Defendant Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center's motion for summary
judgment, filed March 14, 2014;
3

P0005/0008 F-448

05-29-'15 10:28 FROM-

f.

Defendant Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center's memorandum in
support of its motion for summary judgment and all exhibits and affidavits
attached thereto or referenced therein, filed March 14, 2014;

g. Plaintiffs Eric and Carol English's memorandum in opposition to
Defendant Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center's motion for summary
judgment and aU exhibits and affidavits attached thereto or referenced
therein, filed March 27, 2014;
h. Defendant Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center's reply memorandum
in support of its motion for summary judgment and all exhibits and
affidavits attached thereto or referenced therein, filed April 4,
1.

2014;

The trial court's Opinion and Order Granting Medical Defendants'
Motions for Summary Judgment, filed June 27, 2014;

J· The trial court's Judgments of Dismissal with Prejudice, filed June 30,
2014 and July'8,

2014;

k. Plaintiffs Eric and Carol English's motion for reconsideration, filed July 7,
2014;

1. Plaintiffs Eric and Carol English's memorandum in support of motion for
reconsideration and all exhibits and affidavits attached thereto or
referenced therein, filed July 7,

2014;

m. Defendant James Taylor, D.O.'s memorandum in opposition to Plaintiffs
Eric and Carol English's motion for reconsideration and all exhibits and
affidavits attached thereto or referenced therein, filed August 28, 2014;

4
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Eastern Idaho Regional Medical ,__,..,, •..,._ ..

memorandum

English's

Eric

motion

reconsideration and all exhibits and affidavits attached thereto or
referenced therein, filed August 28, 2014;
o. Plaintiffs Eric and Carol English's reply memorandum in support of
motion for reconsideration and all exhibits and affidavits attached thereto
or referenced therein, filed September 4,

2014;

p. The trial court's Opinion and Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for
Reconsideration, filed October 29,

2014;

q. The trial court's Order Granting Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification of
Judgments of Dismissal of Medical Defendants and Rule 54(b)
Certification, filed .January 21, 2015.
6.

I certify:
a. That service of the amended notice of appeal has been made upon the

reporter of the proceedings at issue as named below:
i. Mary Fox, Seventh District Court, Bonneville County Courthouse,
605 North Capital Avenue, Idaho Falls, ID 83402.
b. That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fees for

preparation of the designated reporter's transcript as required by Rule 24;
c. That the estimated fees for preparation of the clerk's record have been
paid;

5
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That all appellate filing fees

been paid; and

other parties required to

been made

served

pursuant to Rule 20.

Dated this

~ of May,

HOLDEN, KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO

2015

r~~

~Casperson

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

6
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on t h i s ~ of May, 2015, I caused a true and correct
to served via U.S. Mail on the following:
Marvin M. Smith
Marvin K. Smith
Smith & Banks
2010 Jennie Lee Drive
Idaho Falls, ID 83404

Attorneys for Defendants Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center
Michael Wheiler
Richard Friess
Thomsen Holman Wheiler
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, ID 83404

Attorneys for Defendant James Taylor, D.O.
William Dryden
CraigYabui

ELAM&BURKE
251 E. Front St., Ste. 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701

Attorneys for Defendants Cook Incorporated, Cook Medical Incorporated, and Cook
Medical Technologies, LLC
Douglas B. King
Brian D. Burbrink
WOODEN & MCLAUGHLIN LLP
One Indiana Square, Ste. 1800
211 N. Pennsylvania
Indianapolis, IN 46204
Attorneysfor Defendants Cooklncorporated, Cook Medical Incorporated, and Cook
Medical Technologies, LLC
Mary Fox
Seventh District Court
Bonneville County Courthouse
605 North Capital Avenue
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
CAROL ENGLISH and ERIC ENGLISH,
wife and Husband,
Plaintiff's/Appellant's,
vs.
JAMES TAYLOR, D.O.; EASTERN IDAHO
HEALTH SERVICES, INC. dba EASTER
IDAHO REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
an Idaho Corporation,
Defendant's/ Respondent's,

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Bonneville

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2013-4868
Docket No. 42947

CLERK'S CERTIFICATION
OF EXHIBITS

)
)
)

I, Ronald Longmore, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Bonneville, do hereby certify that the foregoing Exhibits were marked for
identification and offered in evidence, admitted, and used and considered by the Court in its determination
No Exhibits Reported
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the District Court
this

~

,;,,A..

/

day of June, 2015.
RONALD LONGMORE
Clerk of the District Court

Deputy Clerk

CLERK'S CERTlFICA TION OF EXHIBITS - 1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
CAROL ENGLISH and ERIC ENGLISH,
wife and Husband,
Plaintiff's/Appellant's,
vs.
JAMES TAYLOR, D.O.; EASTERN IDAHO
HEALTH SERVICES, INC. dbaEASTER
IDAHO REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
an Idaho Corporation,
Defendant's/ Respondent's,

STATE OF IDAHO
i

County of Bonneville

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2013-4868
Docket No. 42947

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

)
)
)

I, Ronald Longmore, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Bonneville, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing Record in the
above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction and is a true, correct and complete
Record of the pleadings and documents as are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate
Rules.
I do further certify that all exhibits, offered or admitted in the above-entitled cause, will be duly
lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along with the Court Reporter's Transcript (if requested) and
the Clerk's Record as required by Rule 31 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand affixed the seal of the District Court this
day ofJun~, 2015.
RONALD LONGMORE
Clerk of the District Court

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE - 1

3

Deputy Clerk

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE - 2

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
CAROL ENGLISH and ERIC ENGLISH,
wife and Husband,
Plaintiff's/Appellant's,
vs.
JAMES TAYLOR, D.O.; EASTERN IDAHO
HEALTH SERVICES, INC. dba EASTER
IDAHO REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
an Idaho Corporation,
Defendant's/ Respondent's,

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2013-4868
Docket No. 42947

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

day of June, 2015, I served a copy of the Reporter's

Transcript (if requested) and the Clerk's Record in the Appeal to the Supreme Court in the above entitled
cause upon the following attorneys:

DeAnne Casperson
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405

J. Michael Wheiler
Thomsen Holman Wheiler, PLLC
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Marvin M. Smith
Smith & Banks, PLLC
2010 Jennie Lee Drive
Idaho Falls, ID 83404

by depositing a copy of each thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, in an envelope addressed
to said attorneys at the foregoing address, which is the last address of said attorneys known to me.

RONALD LONGMORE
Clerk of the District Court

By: - - - - - - - - - - Deputy Clerk

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE - l

